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.bstract
Fhis paper investigates the role of at money in decentrali:ed markets, 9here pro-
ducers have private information aIout the Juality of the goods they supply. Koney
is divisiIle, terms of trade are determined endogenously, and agents can nance
their consumption 9ith money or 9ith real production. When the fraction of high
Juality producers in the economy is given, money promotes the production of high-
Juality goods, 9hich improves the Juality miM and 9elfare unamIiguously. When
this fraction is endogenous, ho9ever, 9e nd that money can Ie valued even though
it decreases 9elfare relative to the Iarter eJuiliIrium. Fhe origin of this ine!ciency
is that money provides consumption insurance to lo9-Juality producers, 9hich can
result in a higher fraction of lo9-Juality producers in the monetary eJuiliIrium.
Finally, 9e nd that most often agents acJuire more information in the monetary
eJuiliIrium. ConseJuently, money is 9elfare-enhancing Iecause it promotes useful
production and eMchange, Iut not Iecause it saves information costs.
Ke%w"rdsP Koney, search, adverse selection, moral ha:ard.
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!!The recognition that information is imperfect1 that obtaining
information can be costly1 that there are important asymmetries
of information1 and that the e6tent of information asymmetries is
affected by actions of firms and individuals ... has provided e6:
planations of economic and social phenomena that otherwise would be
hard to understand.<< Joseph Stiglit? @2BBBC
7 (ntr"ducti"n
Fhis paper studies the role of money in decentrali:ed markets 9here agents have private
information aIout the Juality of the goods they supply. We address three issues that
are at the crossroads of the economics of information and the pure theory of money Xsee
the Joseph Stiglit: Juotation aIoveY. First, 9e eMplore ho9 money a"ects the supply of
high-Juality goods Xthe Juality miMY 9hen the fraction of high-Juality producers in the
economy is eMogenous. Fhis Juestion is related to Akerlof_s X1970Y paper on alemonsb
and the adverse selection proIlem. Second, 9e endogeni:e the fraction of high-Juality
producers and consider ho9 money a"ects agents_ incentives to engage in opportunistic
Iehavior, i.e., to produce lemons. Along the lines of Williamson and Wright X1994Y, this
analysis addresses the role of money in alleviating the moral ha:ard proIlem. Fhird, 9e
consider ho9 money a"ects agents_ decision to acJuire information. We investigate the
validity of *runner and Kelt:er_s X1971Y and Ting and Plosser_s X19QcY claim that money
is a suIstitute for information acJuisition.1
Fo analy:e these issues, 9e Iuild a search model of money along the lines of Shi X1999Y
and *erentsen and Rocheteau X2000aY, 9here the eMchange process and the formation of
the terms of trade are made eMplicit. Koney and goods are perfectly divisiIle, and the
terms of trade are determined in Iilateral meetings through alternating o"er Iargaining
games. In contrast to most matching models of money, all agents in the market are endo9ed
9ith money and production opportunities, 9hich allo9s them to nance their purchases
through real production, money, or Ioth. In order to aIstract from the douIle coincidence
proIlem, 9e assume that a commodity of a given Juality provides the same utility to all
agents. Fhis setting allo9s us to focus on private information, 9hich, according to Alchian
X1977Y, is the principal friction underlying the institution of monetary eMchange.
We rst sho9 ho9 money a"ects the terms of trade, that is, the Juantities produced
1Fhere is a voluminous literature that studies the functioning of markets 9ith asymmetric information.
For a survey, see Stiglit: X19Q7Y. Fhere also are a large numIer of articles that attempt to eMplain the use
of money. Fhere are only a fe9 articles that connect these t9o elds. Among them are Alchian X1977Y,
*anerdee and Kaskin X199cY, *runner and Kelt:er X1971Y, Ting and Plosser X19QcY, Fredos X1999Y, and
Williamson and Wright X1994Y.
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and consumed in each meeting. We identify t9o e"ects. Fhe rst e"ect is related to the
recogni:aIility property of money. With valued money, sellers can ask to Ie paid 9ith
money, an oIdect of universally recogni:aIle Juality, instead of 9ith goods of uncertain
Juality. Fhis possiIility cro9ds out the use of real production as a means to nance
consumption. Fhis cro9ding out of real goods payments Iy monetary payments is 9hat
9e call the recognizability e!ect of money.
Fhe second e"ect is the insurance e!ect of money. With money, Iuyers consume more
relative to 9hat they consume in the Iarter economy Iecause money disconnects 9hat
Iuyers can Iuy from ho9 they are perceived. In this sense, money acts as consumption
insurance. In particular, this insurance allo9s lo9-Juality producers to consume even
9hen they are recogni:ed as lemon producers. In contrast, in a Iarter economy, recogni:ed
lo9-Juality producers cannot consume, Iecause lo9-Juality goods are 9orthless.
Fhe rst part of the paper investigates the adverse selection proIlem. We assume
that the fraction of high-Juality producers is eMogenous. Fhe supply of lo9- and high-
Juality goods, ho9ever, is endogenous, Iecause the Juantities produced and consumed are
negotiated Iet9een agents in Iilateral meetings. Fhe key result of this section is that
Ioth an increase in the real value of money and an increase in the level of information
improve the Juality miM.2 We also sho9 that moving from Iarter to monetary eMchange is
strictly 9elfare-improving, Iecause money promotes the production of high-Juality goods
and reduces the production of lemons. Fhus, money is a device to partially overcome the
adverse selection proIlem that arises in Iarter.
In the second part of the paper, 9e endogeni:e the fraction of high-Juality producers to
study ho9 money a"ects agents_ incentives to Iecome either high- or lo9-Juality producers.
We assume that prior to each match all agents choose the Juality of the good they 9ill
supply and that this decision is irrevocaIle once the match is formed. Fhe recogni:aIility
e"ect raises the Ienet of Ieing a high-Juality producer, and therefore induces agents
to produce high-Juality goods more often. In contrast, the insurance e"ect increases the
Ienet of Ieing a lo9-Juality producer. Fhis e"ect, therefore, induces agents to take more
risks, that is, to Iecome lemon producers more often. ConseJuently, money can eMacerIates
the moral hazard problem.
Which e"ect dominates depends on the severity of the information proIlem. If the
information proIlem is severe, that is, if most often agents do not recogni:e the Juality
of the goods, then the recogni:aIility e"ect of money dominates the insurance e"ect and
the fraction of high-Juality producers is larger in the monetary eJuiliIrium than in the
Iarter eJuiliIrium. When the level of information increases, the recogni:aIility e"ect
Iecomes relatively less important and is eventually dominated Iy the insurance e"ect. As
2In this sense, money and information are suIstitutes. Fhe Juality miM is the ratio of the production
of high-Juality goods to the production of all goods.
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a conseJuence, if the information proIlem is not too severe, the fraction of high-Juality
producers is smaller in the monetary eJuiliIrium than in the Iarter eJuiliIrium. Koreover,
for some parameter values 9elfare is strictly lo9er in the monetary eJuiliIrium than in the
Iarter eJuiliIrium. Finally, if information is aIundant, no monetary eJuiliIrium eMists,
9hereas a Iarter eJuiliIrium eMists 9here all agents produce high-Juality goodsP there is
no need for money in an economy 9here noIody cheats.
In the third part of the paper, 9e endogeni:e the level of information Iy allo9ing
agents to invest in a costly inspection technology. Fhis investment improves their aIility
to recogni:e the Juality of the goods supplied in the market. We nd that there is al9ays
a positive fraction of cheaters in eJuiliIrium. Uence, heterogeneous Juality is a natural
outcome 9hen the information structure of the economy is endogeni:ed. We sho9 that for
most parameter values agents invest more in information in the monetary economy than
in the Iarter economy. Koreover, 9hen information costs are high there is no active Iarter
eJuiliIrium, 9hereas an active monetary eJuiliIrium al9ays eMists. Fhus, in contrast
to *runner and Kelt:er X1971Y and Ting and Plosser X19QcY, our model suggests that
information acJuisition and money are complements.R Fhe Iasis for this result is that
money Iy providing consumption insurance increases the return of information, 9hich
induces agents to acJuire more information than in the Iarter eJuiliIrium.
eur paper is most closely related to the random-matching models of money ofWilliamson
and Wright X1994Y, Tim X199cY, and Fredos X1999Y.4 Zike Williamson and Wright X1994Y,
9e consider an environment 9here in the aIsence of private information there is a douIle
coincidence of real 9ants in each meeting. Fhis allo9s us to aIstract from the douIle
coincidence of real 9ants proIlem that is most often used to eMplain money Xe.g. Tiyotaki
and Wright X1991, 199RYY, and to focus on asymmetric information as an eMplanation for
9hy agents use at money. In contrast to Williamson and Wright X1994Y and Tim X199cY,
9ho consider environments 9here Ioth money and goods are indivisiIle and 9here agents
can hold at most one oIdect at a time, 9e have divisiIle money, divisiIle goods, and no
inventory restrictions on money holdings. In contrast to Fredos X1999Y, in our analysis
money is perfectly divisiIle and the cost of cheating is endogenous Iecause it depends on
the eJuiliIrium terms of trade. Furthermore, Fredos X1999Y rules out Iarter trades, 9hich
implies that money has a 9elfare-improving role even in the aIsence of a private informa-
tion proIlem. Finally, *anerdee and Kaskin X199cY consider the adverse selection proIlem
Rfuoting *runner and Kelt:er X1971, p.799YP aFor individuals, money is a suIstitute for investment in
information and laIor allocated to search. *y using money, individuals reduce the amount of information
they must acJuire, process, and store.b
4Private information proIlems in search models of money have also Ieen studied Iy Cuadras-Koratg
X1994Y, Zi X1995Y, ;reen and WeIer X199cY, Uaegler X1997Y, Fredos X1997Y, and helde et al. X1999Y. All
these papers, ho9ever, concentrate on issues Juite di"erent from the ones 9e treat.
R
in a Walrasian frame9ork, 9here each good can Ie produced in t9o Jualities. Fhey sho9
that the commodity that has the smallest discrepancy Iet9een the t9o Jualities 9ill emerge
endogenously as the medium of eMchange. In this sense, they derive rather than assume
the recogni:aIility property of money.
In contrast to most random-matching models of money, our frame9ork does not rely
on the indivisiIility of money and inventory restrictions. In particular, divisiIle money
allo9s us to study the e"ects of changes in the gro9th rate of the money supply on the
Juality miM and the incentive to produce high-Juality goods. Interestingly, it also greatly
simplies the typology of eJuiliIria. In particular, under the Friedman rule 9e generically
nd uniJueness of the monetary eJuiliIrium. Another important di"erence 9ith respect to
the standard search literature is that 9e allo9 matched agents to nance their consumption
9ith money, real production, or Ioth, 9hich makes it clear that matched agents face neither
an eMplicit nor an implicit cash-in-advance constraint. Koreover, divisiIle money Ireaks
the articial link Iet9een the Juantity of money and the fraction of Iuyers. In fact, an
important characteristic of the model is that money is neutral Iut not superneutral.5
Fhe remainder of the paper is organi:ed as follo9s. In Section 2 9e present the envi-
ronment. Section R descriIes the eJuiliIrium and identies the recogni:aIility e"ect and
the insurance e"ect of money. Section 4 addresses the adverse selection proIlem 9hen the
fraction of high-Juality producers is eMogenous. In Section 5, the fraction of lemon produc-
ers is endogeni:ed. Section c endogeni:es the information level in the economy. Section 7
concludes.
5In contrast to most search models of money, in our divisiIle money frame9ork money is neutral,
and 9ithout search eMternalities or private information the Friedman rule holds Xsee *erentsen 2001Y.
Fherefore, our model is not suIdect to *anerdee and Kaskin_s X199c, p. 9c0Y critism that aone may run
into trouIle 9hen Iasing the theory of money on search frictions 9hile relying on the Walrasian model for
one_s other macroeconomic intuitions.b
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9 En:ir"n+ent
We consider a random-matching model 9ith divisiIle goods and divisiIle money along
the lines of Shi X1999Y. Fhe economy is populated 9ith a large numIer of innitely-lived
households, each consisting of a continuum of memIers of measure one that regard the
household_s utility as the common oIdective. In the market, household memIers attempt
to eMchange money or their production good for consumption goods. In this attempt
household memIers follo9 the strategy that has Ieen given to them Iy their households.
After trading, household memIers return home, 9here they pool their money holdings.
Fhis assumption allo9s us to aIstract from distriIutional issues and to focus on the e"ect
of private information on the formation of the terms of trades and on the incentive to
produce high-Juality goods 9ithin a representative household frame9ork.c
We consider symmetric eJuiliIria only, 9here all households consume and produce the
same Juantities. In the follo9ing 9e refer to an arIitrary household as household h. 1e-
cision variaIles of this household are denoted Iy lo9ercase letters. Capital letters denote
other households_ variaIles, 9hich are taken as given Iy the representative household h.
*ecause 9e 9ill only consider the steady state eJuiliIria 9here all real variaIles are con-
stant, 9e most often omit the time indeM. Nevertheless, Iecause in a steady state nominal
variaIles are not necessarily constant, the indeM i1 refers to a variaIle at the follo9ing
period, and the indeM -1 to the variaIle at the previous period.
9.7 <ec=n">"g% preferences
Fhere is a continuum of nonstoraIle goods, 9here each good can Ie produced in lo9 or
high Juality. We assume that the Juality of goods is an inspection attriIuteP the only 9ay
to discover the Juality of a good is to consume it. Uousehold h has the technology to
produce one good, and it derives utility from consuming all high-Juality goods other than
its production good.
Producing q units of a good of high Juality yields disutility c (q) = q. Producing lo9-
Juality goods XlemonsY costs nothing. Fhe instantaneous utility of consuming q units of a
commodity of high Juality is u(q), 9here u(q) is increasing and t9ice di"erentiaIle, and
satises u (0) = 0, u! (0) = ", and u!! (q) < 0. Furthermore, there eMists q! > 0 such
that u!(q!) = 1. Consuming a lemon generates no utility. ;oods cannot Ie stored, and
production is instantaneous. Fhe utility of a household in one period is the sum of the
consumption utilities of its memIers minus their disutility of production. Fhe discount
cA family construct of this type 9as introduced Iy Zucas X1990Y. In search models of money it 9as
rst used Iy Shi X1997, 1999Y.
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factor is ! # (0, 1).7
In sections R and 4 9e assume that the fraction of household memIers that produce high
Juality, denoted Iy !, is eMogenous and identical across households. Uolding ! constant
allo9s us to study the relation Iet9een money and the adverse selection proIlem. In
section 5 9e endogeni:e ! to see ho9 money a"ects this choice.
In addition to the consumption goods, there is also an intrinsically 9orthless, storaIle,
and fully divisiIle oIdect called at money. At the Ieginning of each period, each household
has m units of money per memIer.
Fhe chronology of events 9ithin a period is as follo9s. First, the money stock is
divided evenly Iet9een eM ante identical household memIers, and each memIer receives
m units of money.Q Second, the household memIers are endo9ed 9ith the production
technology allo9ing them to produce in the market. Fhird, they leave the household to
search for trading partners. Prior to the matching phase, a fraction ! of all household
memIers receives a technology shock that allo9s them to produce high-Juality goods. Fhe
remaining fraction of household memIers can only produce lo9-Juality goods. Fourth,
household memIers are matched and carry out their eMchanges according to the prescriIed
strategies. Within a period, a memIer of the household cannot transfer money Ialances to
another memIer of the same household. After trading, memIers Iring Iack their receipts
of money, and each agent consumes the goods he has Iought. At the end of a period, the
household receives a lump-sum money transfer " , 9hich can Ie negative, and then carries
the stock m!" to t+ 1.
Fhe Juantity of money in the economy is assumed to gro9 at the gross gro9th rate #.
We restrict # to Ie larger than the discount factor !.9 Fhe XindirectY marginal utility of
money is denoted Iy $. It is eJual to !V !(m!"), 9here V (m) is the steady-state lifetime
discounted utility of a household holding m units of money.
9.9 (nf"r+ati"n
Fime is discrete. In each period, household memIers meet pair9ise and at random. We
normali:e the length of a period so that in each period each household memIer meets
another memIer. When t9o traders meet they Iargain over the terms of trade. *efore 9e
discuss the Iargaining game, ho9ever, let us determine 9hat information matched traders
have and ho9 they use this information to assess the Juality of the good produced Iy their
partner.
7Fhroughout the paper, 9hen 9e present simulations 9e use the specication !!"" # !"!"! and " #
$#%%.
Q*ecause all household_s memIers have the same level of money holdings, there is no signaling through
9ealth.
9Fhis condition guarantees the eMistence of a steady state monetary eJuiliIrium.
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When matched, the traders receive some information aIout the Juality of the goods
produced Iy their partners that they use to form *ayesian Ieliefs. In appendiM A1 9e
model this information as a signal that each trader receives prior to Iargaining, 9hich is
imperfectly correlated 9ith the true characteristic of the good produced Iy his partner in
the match. Fhe signals, 9hich are common kno9ledge in a match, di"er in their reliaIility
taking into account that agents are heterogeneous in their aIility to assess the Juality of
a specic good.10 We assume that all goods of a given Juality Xhigh or lo9Y are eMante
identical in the follo9ing senseP Fhey have the same chance that their Juality is perceived
in a certain 9ay Iy an individual chosen at random.
Consider agent i 9ho is randomly matched to some partner j. From the point of
vie9 of i, the match type is the pair (%!, %"), 9here %" # '0, 1( (%! # '0, 1() denotes the
proIaIility that agent j Xagent iY attriIutes to agent i Xagent jY to Ie a high-Juality
producer. Conditional on the information availaIle to i at the Ieginning of the period,
%! and %" are t9o independent random variaIles. Fhe variaIle %" is distriIuted according
to the cumulative distriIution F#(.) 9ith density f#(.) if i is a high-Juality producer,
and according to the cumulative distriIution F$(.) 9ith density f$(.) if i is a lo9-Juality
producer, and %! is distriIuted according to the unconditional distriIution F (.) 9ith density
f(.) dened as follo9sP
f(x) = !f#(x) + (1$!)f$(x) %x # '0, 1( X1Y
It is sho9n in appendiM A2 that
F$(x) & F#(x) %x # '0, 1(
Fhis rst-order stochastic dominance of F$(.) Iy F#(.) reects the fact that on average
agent i 9ill Ienet from a Ietter assessment from his partner if he is a high-Juality producer
rather than a lo9-Juality one. Furthermore, 9e sho9 in appendiM A2 that the density
functions f(.) and f#(.) are related as follo9sP
xf(x) = !f#(x) %x # '0, 1( X2Y
EJuation X2Y is a property of conditional eMpectations. It states that 9hen making their
*ayesian calculations, agents use all relevant information. EJuation X2Y also implies that! "
#
x dF (x) = !. Individuals do not make mistakes on averageP their Ieliefs are consistent
9ith the fractions of high-Juality producers in the economy.
EJuation X2Y can Ie used to eMpress the means of the distriIutions F$(.) and F#(.),
denoted Iy !$ '%"( and !# '%"(, as a function of the information that is availaIle to the
10ene 9ay to think aIout this information structure is related to Alchian X1977Y, 9ho suggested that
each agent is a specialist in some goods in the economy and a novice in others. A specialist in a good
recogni:es the Juality of the good 9ith a high proIaIility, a novice 9ith a lo9 proIaIility only.
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agents 9hen they Iargain. Fo see this, multiply each side of eJuation X2Y Iy x and integrate
9ith respect to x to get
!! '%"( = &!"!$## + (1$ &)! ' = H,L XRY
9here !"!$## is the indicator function that is eJual to one if ' = H, and 9here & is a
function of the variance (%% of the distriIution F (.) that satises
& =
(%%
! (1$!) X4Y
According to XRY, the mean of the distriIution F!(.) is a 9eighted mean of the Ieliefs of
informed agents X%" = 1 if ' = H, and %" = 0 if ' = LY and the Ieliefs of agents that
are completely uninformed X!Y. Fhe 9eight on the Ieliefs of the informed agents is &.
Fherefore, throughout the paper 9e consider the parameter & to Ie a measure of the level
of information availaIle in the economy.
An information structure satisfying X1Y and X2Y is used Iy Williamson and Wright
X1994Y. With proIaIility & agent i recogni:es perfectly the Juality of a commodity X%! = 1
or %! = 0Y, and 9ith proIaIility 1$ & he has no information X%! = !Y. ConseJuently, the
distriIution of proIaIilities f# , f$, and f take the follo9ing formsP11
f#(0) = 0 f#(!) = 1$ & f#(1) = &
f$(0) = & f$(!) = 1$ & f$(1) = 0
f(0) = & (1$!) f(!) = 1$ & f(1) = &!
X5Y
Fhroughout the paper 9e use this information structure 9hen 9e derive closed form solu-
tions or 9hen 9e present simulations. It can Ie checked from X5Y that & satises X4Y.
9.A Bargaining
Ferms of trade are determined in alternating o"er Iargaining games. In 9hat follo9s 9e
consider the Iargaining Iet9een agents i and j. Fhe match type is characteri:ed Iy the
initial Ieliefs of each player aIout the Juality produced Iy his partner, that is the match
type is % = (%!, %"). ConseJuently, the space of match types is E = '0, 1(
%.
9.A.7 Ru>es "f t=e ga+e12
Suppose that it is agent i_s turn to make an o"er and that he proposes the terms of
trade
"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
, 9here q&" is the Juantity of goods produced Iy agent j and consumed Iy
11*ecause the space of Ieliefs is discrete, $!#", $!!#", and $"!#" are not density functions.
12We formali:e the Iargaining game as closely as possiIle to *erentsen and Rocheteau X2000aY. Fhis
allo9s us to use several results of that paper in the follo9ing. A more detailed description of the Iargaining
game in the Iarter economy is availaIle at httpPjj999-v9i.uniIe.chjsta"jIerentsenjaleks.htm.
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agent i, qs" is the Juantity of goods delivered Iy agent i, and x" is the Juantity of money
eMchanged. If x" > 0, agent i delivers x" units of money to agent j, and if x" < 0, he
receives x" units of money. Fhe suIscript % indicates that these Juantities 9ill depend on
the Ieliefs % = (%!, %"). Fhese Ieliefs are common kno9ledge in the match.
F9o important features of the Iargaining are that XiY Iargaining strategies are deter-
mined at the household level Iut are carried out Iy household memIers, and XiiY households_
strategies depend on the match type % and on the distriIution of their potential Iargaining
partners_ characteristics, 9hich is degenerate in eJuiliIrium. Fhey do not depend on the
specic level of money holdings of the partner in the match.1R
Fhe Iargaining proceeds as follo9s. Each period is divided into an innite numIer of
suIperiods of length " 9here " is small. If, in a given suIperiod, it is agent i_s turn to
make an o"er and agent j redects the o"er, in the follo9ing suIperiod it is agent j_s turn to
make a countero"er. If an o"er is refused, the negotiation Ireaks do9n 9ith proIaIility )"
X) > 0Y. Fhe possiIility of an eMogenous Ireakdo9n of the negotiation gives an incentive
to traders to agree immediately. Furthermore, 9e assume that the players can al9ays
retract their o"ers and that if an o"er is retracted, the game ends.14 Allo9ing retractaIle
o"ers guarantees that no agent is forced to trade after he has recogni:ed his partner is a
lo9-Juality producer.
When t9o randomly chosen agents i and j meet, they do not kno9 9hether their
partner is a high-Juality or a lo9-Juality producer. Uence, the Iargaining game is a game
9ith t9o-sided incomplete information. In the follo9ing, 9e argue that an eJuiliIrium
cannot Ie a separating eJuiliIrium 9here high- and lo9-Juality producers are recogni:ed
Iy their o"ers or acceptance rules in the Iargaining game. Suppose, to the contrary, that
there is a separating eJuiliIrium 9here at some stage of the game lo9-Juality producers
are recogni:ed 9ith certainty. In this eJuiliIrium, they could never trade, Iecause there is
no gain from Iuying a lemon.15 ConseJuently, lo9-Juality producers have an incentive to
deviate from the strategy that supposedly sustains a separating eJuiliIrium Iy imitating
the strategy of a high-Juality producer. Fherefore, a separating eJuiliIrium cannot eMist.
In the follo9ing, therefore, 9e focus on pooling eJuiliIria. Koreover, 9e restrict the
prole of strategies to Ie stationary in the follo9ing sense. At each information set, a
player_s strategy only depends on his o9n Ielief aIout his partner_s type and the Ielief of
his opponent aIout his o9n type. Uence, if in t9o di"erent informations sets of the game
1RFor a discussion of this assumption, see *erentsen and Rocheteau X2001Y.
14We impose the rule that a game ends after a player has retracted his o"er for tractaIility. In general,
there is no reason that the players cannot continue to negotiate, since eM-post k after an o"er is retracted
k they 9ill have an incentive to do so. See Kuthoo X1999Y for an analysis of retractaIle o"ers in Iargaining
games.
15Recall that a player can retract his o"er at any time, so no trader is ever forced to trade 9ith an agent
that is recogni:ed as a lo9-Juality producer.
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the Ieliefs of the t9o players are eJual, and if it is player i_s turn to make an o"er, he 9ill
make the same o"er, and agent j 9ill apply the same acceptance rule.
9.A.9 . re!ne+ent "f seDuentia> eDui>ibriu+
Kany seJuential pooling eJuiliIria can Ie sustained, depending on ho9 the players_ Ieliefs
after they oIserve an out of eJuiliIrium move are specied. Fhe reason for this multiplicity
is that the concept of seJuential eJuiliIrium imposes fe9 restrictions on the formation of
the Ieliefs after an out-of-eJuiliIrium move. Kany of these Ieliefs act as aunreasonaIleb
threats. In order to eMclude such Ieliefs and to attain a uniJue eJuiliIrium, 9e impose
restrictions regarding the Ieliefs that agents hold 9hen they oIserve actions that are not
consistent 9ith the eJuiliIrium strategies.1c
Fhe idea of the renement is that if there is an uneMpected move Iy one player, the
responding player evaluates Xrationali:esY for 9hich type such a deviation is Ienecial if he
accepts it. Fhere are t9o rulesP First, 9e allo9 for pessimistic condectures in the follo9ing
circumstances. If a player deviates 9ith respect to his eJuiliIrium strategies Iy proposing
to supply more goods, and if this proposal lo9ers the eMpected payo" of the deviating player
if he is a high-Juality producer, then the responding agent assumes that the o"er is from
a lo9-Juality producer 9ith certainty. Second, 9e do not allo9 for optimistic condectures.
For all other deviations, the responding agent does not update his Ielief.
Fo dene and eMplain the rst rule, consider an %-meeting, and suppose that it is agent
i_s turn to make an o"er. 1enote Iy
"
Q&", Q
s
",X"
#
the eJuiliIrium o"er k or the o"er made
Iy other agents in the same type of meetings k and Iy
"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
the o"er Iy i. Agent
j 9ill update his Ielief after i_s proposal if and only if the follo9ing t9o ineJualities are
satisedP
%!u(q
&
")$ qs" $ x"# < %!u(Q&")$Qs" $X"# XcY
qs" > Q
s
" X7Y
IneJuality XcY means that agent i_s o"er
"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
does not increase the surplus of agent i
if he is a high-Juality producer, and ineJuality X7Y means that agent i proposes to produce
more than 9hat others producers propose to supply in the same match types. IneJuality
X7Y captures the fact that the only 9ay for a lo9-Juality producer to improve his situation
is Iy proposing to produce more, Iecause production is costless to him.17
1cA renement similar in spirit is descriIed in esIorne and RuIinstein X1990, Section 5.5Y, or in Cho
and Treps X19Q7Y.
17If producers are constrained to supply a given Juantity "s", Ioth high- and lo9-Juality producers 9ill
choose the same values for "$" and %" in order to maMimi:e their eMpected surpluses suIdect to the acceptance
rule of their partner and the constraints on money holdings. Fhus, high- and lo9-Juality producers only
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eur renement has the follo9ing implications. First, the rst rule implies that if an
agent has an o"er
"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
that improves the situation of a high-Juality producer com-
pared to
"
Q&", Q
s
",X"
#
, this proposal 9ill not Ie interpreted as coming from a lo9-Juality
producerP Ue is not punished Iy the Ieliefs of his partner. Fhus, Ieliefs that act as aun-
reasonaIleb threats are not possiIle. Second, high-Juality producers cannot signal their
nature, Iecause their partners never upgrade their initial assessment. Fhis rule comes from
our focus on pooling eJuiliIria. Fhird, lo9-Juality producers al9ays propose to supply Qs"
units of their output, and adopt the same acceptance rule than high-Juality producers.
Fourth, the renement generates a uniJue eJuiliIrium. Indeed, under these rules high-
Juality producers can al9ays maMimi:e their payo" suIdect to the reservation value of
their partner 9ithout the risk of Ieing punished Iecause of some aunreasonaIleb Ieliefs.
ConseJuently, there is a uniJue eJuiliIrium strategy for high-Juality producers, 9hich also
pins do9n the eJuiliIrium strategies of lo9-Juality producers.
A EDui>ibriu+
In this section 9e descriIe the program of the household 9hen the fraction of high-Juality
producers ! is eMogenous. We assume that ! < 1, so that there is a positive fraction of
cheaters in the economy.1Q
A.7 <=e "!ers
In the monetary economy each agent holds m units of money 9hen matched. Fo derive the
o"ers, 9ithout loss of generality, 9e restrict our attention to an (%!, %")-meeting Iet9een
memIer i of household h and some agent j from another household. RememIer that from
the point of vie9 of agent j the match type is %! = (%", %!).
In the alternating o"er game, o"ers and countero"ers converge to the same limiting
proposal 9hen " goes to :ero. ConseJuently, the rst-mover advantage vanishes 9hen
" goes to :ero.19 *ecause of this and Iecause it facilitates the derivation of the envelope
condition, 9e let memIers of household hmake the rst o"er in all meetings. In eJuiliIrium
all households have the same characteristicsP as a conseJuence, rst o"ers of household h
are al9ays accepted. Koreover, Iecause the length of time Iet9een t9o consecutive o"ers
di"er in the Juantity of goods they 9ould like to supply. *ecause for lo9-Juality producers production is
costless, they 9ould like to produce unIounded Juantities.
1QA monetary eJuiliIrium 9ith ! # & does not eMist, Iecause there is no need for money in an economy
9here noIody cheats and 9here in each meeting there is a symmetric douIle coincidence of real 9ants.
19Fhis argument is standard in the Iargaining literature. See, for eMample, Kuthoo X1999, chapter RY,
esIorne and RuIinstein X1990, chaper RY.
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is innitesimal, the rst o"ers are eJual to the countero"ers that 9ould have Ieen made
Iy h_s partners.
.gent i is a =ig=EDua>it% pr"ducer. Suppose that i proposes the terms of trade"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
, and denote Iy # the marginal value of money of other households Xincluding
jY. If agent j accepts the o"er
"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
and if x" > 0, the acJuired amount of money
x" 9ill add to the money Ialances of j_s household at the Ieginning of the neMt period,
9hose value today is #x". If R"! denotes the reservation value of a high-Juality producer
from another household, any optimal o"er
"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
must make a high-Juality producer
dust indi"erent Iet9een accepting or redecting the o"erP
%"u (q
s
")$ q&" + x"# = R"! XQY
*y stating this optimality condition 9e take the follo9ing facts into accountP First, as
discussed in the previous section, as long as high-Juality producers maMimi:e their eMpected
surplus in the match suIdect to the acceptance rule of their partner, ineJualities XcY and
X7Y are never satised simultaneously, and conseJuently according to our renement %"
remains unchanged. Fhus, 9hen a high-Juality producer maMimi:es his o9n payo" suIdect
to the reservation value R"!, he can take the Ielief %" as given. Second, agent i is only
concerned 9hether the o"er
"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
is acceptaIle Iy a high-Juality producer. Fhird,
the reservation value R"! is taken as given Iy the household of agent i.
.gent i is a >"wEDua>it% pr"ducer. *y similar reasoning, an optimal o"er
"$q&", $qs", $x"#
Iy a lo9-Juality producer must satisfy
%"u ($qs")$ $q&" + $x"# = R"! X9Y
In eJuiliIrium, any o"er
"$q&", $qs", $x"# that satises X9Y and 9hich is distinct from "Q&", Qs", X"#
9ill satisfy XcY. Fherefore, our renement implies that lo9-Juality producers cannot pro-
pose to produce more than Qs" other9ise they reveal themselves as lo9-Juality producersP
$qs" = Qs" X10Y
Finally, the reservation utility of agent j if j is a high-Juality producer is dened as follo9s.
If it is agent j_s turn to make an o"er, he proposes the terms of trade
"
Q&"! , Q
s
"! ,X"!
#
. Fhus,
the reservation value of a high-Juality producer 9hen the match type is %! = (%", %!) is
given Iy
R"! = (1$ )")
%
%"u
"
Q&"!
#$Qs"! $X"!#& X11Y
Note that X"! is a monetary transfer from j to i.
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Finally, note that at the eJuiliIrium of this Iargaining game, a lo9-Juality producer
has no incentive to refuse the eJuiliIrium o"er and to delay the agreement in order to make
a countero"er that is identical to those made Iy high-Juality producers.20
A.9 <=e pr"gra+ "f t=e ="use=">d
When the household determines the trading strategies, it is suIdect to t9o sets of con-
straints. First, household memIers cannot spend more money than 9hat they haveP
x" ' m $x" ' m %% # E X12Y
Second, household memIers cannot ask for more money than 9hat their Iargaining partner
holdsP
$x" 'M $ $x" 'M %% # E X1RY
Note that X12Y and X1RY are not cash-in-advance constraints, Iecause in each match agents
can also nance their purchases 9ith their o9n production. As previously mentioned, $qs" =
Qs". Fhen, a household_s trading strategy consists of the terms of trade
"
q&", q
s
", x", $q&", $x"#
for each % # E, and an acceptance rule for each o"er "Q&"! , Qs"! , X"!# Iy another household.
Agent i from household hmakes the rst o"er, 9hich is immediately accepted Iy j. For each
period, the household chooses
'
m!",
"
q&", q
s
", x", $q&", $x"#""(( to solve the follo9ing dynamic
programming proIlemP21
V (m) = )*+
()b!*)s! *+!*$)b!*$+!)!!E *,+1
)
*
*
(
%
%!u
"
q&"
#$ qs"& f#(%")f(%!)d%!d%" X14Y
+(1$ *)
*
(
%!u
"$q&"# f$(%")f(%!)d%!d%" + !V (m!")+
20Fhis point is demonstrated eMplicitly in the case of the Iarter economy. For more details see our
eMtended description of the Iargaining game at httpPjj999-v9i.uniIe.chjsta"jIerentsenjaleks.htm.
21Alternatively, the program can Ie 9ritten as follo9sP
& !'" # '()
"%!!&%
s
!&'!&$%!!&$'!#!!E&(!1
)
#!
*
)
%
!
"
"$"
#$ "s"& $!!$*"$!!$+"d$+d$*
*#!&$!"
*
)
+$"s", $!!$*"$"!$+"d$+d$*
*!&$ #"!
*
)
!
"$"$"# $"!$*"$!!$+"d$+d$* * "& !'$!"+
Fhis eJuation has the follo9ing interpretation. In a fraction #! of the meetings, Ioth agents in the
match are high-Juality producers. Fhen, households_ memIers Ioth endoy utility of consumption and
su"er disutility of production. In a fraction #!&$!" of the meetings, household memIers are high-Juality
producers 9hereas their partners are lemon producers. In this case, households_ memIers only su"er
the disutility of production. In a fraction !& $ #"! of the meetings, household memIers are lo9-Juality
producers 9hereas their partners are high-Juality producers. In this case, households_ memIers only endoy
utility of production. In the remaining meetings, Ioth traders are lo9-Juality producers.
1R
s.t. XQY, X9Y, X12Y, X1RY, and
m!" $m = " $ *
*
(
x"f#(%")f(%!)d%!d%" $ (1$ *)
*
(
$x"f$(%")f(%!)d%!d%" X15Y
Fhe variaIles taken as given in the aIove proIlem are the state variaIle m and other
households_ choices Xthe uppercase variaIlesY. Koreover, in this section the fraction *
of high-Juality producers of the household is assumed to Ie eMogenous and eJual to !.
Fhe rst integral in eJuation X14Y aggregates the net eMpected utilities of all high-Juality
memIers in all meetings, 9here high-Juality producers o"er the trades
"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
, 9hich
are immediately accepted Iy their trading partners. Fhe second integral aggregates the net
eMpected utilities of all lo9-Juality memIers 9here lo9-Juality producers o"er the trades"$q&", $qs", $x"#, 9hich are also immediately accepted Iy their trading partners. EJuation X15Y
species the la9 of motion of the household_s money Ialances. Fhe rst term on the right-
hand side is the amount of the lump-sum transfer the household receives each period. Fhe
second and third terms are the net amounts of money that high-Juality and lo9-Juality
producers receive in each period.
A.A <=e s%++etric stead% state eDui>ibriu+
In the follo9ing 9e assume that the length of time Iet9een an o"er and a countero"er is in-
nitely small X"( 0Y, and 9e focus on symmetric eJuiliIria 9here all households make the
same o"ers and adopt the same acceptance rules. *ecause lo9- and high-Juality producers
make the same o"ers X
"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
=
"$q&", $qs", $x"#%% # El see the appendiMY and Iecause !
is eMogenous, the symmetric steady state eJuiliIrium of this economy corresponds to the
eJuiliIrium of the complete information model of *erentsen and Rocheteau X2000aY. In
the appendiM AR 9e sho9 that there is a uniJue steady state monetary eJuiliIrium X$ > 0Y
and a uniJue Iarter eJuiliIrium X$ = 0Y, and 9e demonstrate that the terms of trade and
the marginal value of money can Ie determined as follo9s. First, for a given $, the terms
of trade solve"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
= *,-)*+
%
%!u(q
&
")$ qs" $ x"$
& %
%"u(q
s
")$ q&" + x"$
&
, %% # E X1cY
s.t. $m ' x" ' m
Second, for given terms of trade
"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
, the marginal value of money satises the
follo9ing envelope conditionP
$#" = !
*
(
)*+
%
%!u
!(q&")$,$
&
f(%!)f(%")d%!d%" X17Y
Uence, the model has a very simple structureP Fhe terms of trades correspond to the Nash
Iargaining solution X1cY, and the marginal value of money satises a standard asset pricing
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eJuation X17Y, 9hich has the follo9ing interpretation. For the household, the value of an
additional unit of money received at the end of the previous period is $#". In the current
period, this unit of money can Ie either spent or saved. If it is saved, the value of this
unit of money from the point of vie9 of the previous period is simply !$. If it is spent in
an %$meeting, the additional utility of consumption is %!u!(q&")$. Indeed, from eJuations
XQY and X9Y, one additional unit of money Iuys $ units of real commodity, 9here each unit
provides %!u!(q&") additional utility. Accordingly, an additional unit of money is spent if
and only if the marginal utility of consumption is larger than the marginal value of money,
i.e., if %!u!(q&")$ > $.
Fe!niti"n 7 A monetary steady state equilibrium is a $ > 0 and a set of o!ers,
(q&", q
s
", x")
-
""( that satisfy (16) and (17).
Note that in a monetary steady state eJuiliIrium the Juantities q&" and q
s
" and the
real value of money holdings m$ are stationary. Fherefore, if the money supply is not
stationary X# 6= 1Y, the marginal value of money $ 9ill not Ie stationary either. Fhe Nash
Iargaining solution X1cY implies that the terms of trade in an %-meeting,
"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
, satisfy
the follo9ing t9o eJuationsP
%!%"u
!(q&")u
!(qs") = 1 X1QY
1
%!u! (q&")
=
%"u (q
s
")$ q&" + x"$
%!u (q&")$ qs" $ x"$
X19Y
Furthermore, if neither i nor j is constrained Iy their money holdings, q&" = q
&!
" and q
s
" = q
s!
" ,
9here q&!" and q
s!
" satisfy %!u
!(q&!" ) = 1 and %"u
!(qs!" ) = 1, respectively. Note that the terms of
trade in the Iarter eJuiliIrium are simply oItained Iy setting $ = 0 in eJuation X19Y. Note
further that in any asymmetric meeting X%! 6= %"Y, if %! > %" (%! < %"), there is a transfer of
money from agent i to agent j Xj to iY. In contrast, in any symmetric meeting X%! = %"Y
no money is eMchanged, Iecause there is no need for compensation, and conseJuently in
symmetric meetings the terms of trade are the same as in the Iarter eJuiliIrium. Finally, in
a monetary eJuiliIrium there is some positive production and consumption in all meetings
eMcept 9hen Ioth agents are recogni:ed as lemon producers X%! = %" = 0Y. In contrast, in
the Iarter eJuiliIrium, if one agent is recogni:ed as a lo9-Juality producer Xeither %! = 0
or %" = 0Y, no trade takes place.
Using the fact that # = ,
,"1 =
#"1
#
, the envelope condition X17Y satises
#
!
=
*
(
)*+
%
%!u
!(q&"), 1
&
f(%!)f(%")d%!d%" X20Y
Note that money is neutral in this model. Uo9ever, it is not superneutral, Iecause changing
the gross gro9th rate of the money supply # a"ects the real value of money holdings m$
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and the terms of trade. Second, for ! and & given, the Friedman rule # ( ! maMimi:esm$.
ConseJuently, throughout the paper 9e 9ill often compare the Iarter eJuiliIrium 9ith the
monetary eJuiliIrium under the Friedman rule, Iecause they are Ienchmark cases.22
A.G !"ne% and ter+s "f trade
In this suIsection 9e consider ho9 money a"ects the terms of trade, that is, the Juantities
produced and eMchanged in each meeting.
Hr"p"siti"n 7 Consider a meeting between agents i and j where j is more likely to be
a high-quality producer than i (%! > %"), and assume that i is constrained by his money
holdings. Then $)
b
!
$,#
> 0 and $)
s
!
$,#
< 0.
Hr""fI See eJuations X1QY and X19Y.¥
Proposition 1 considers a meeting Iet9een agents i and j 9ith %! > %" 9here i is
constrained Iy his money holdings.2R Proposition 1 states that an increase in the real
value of money holdings increases the production of those agents 9ho are more likely to
produce high-Juality goods and decreases the production of those agents 9ho are more
likely to produce lemons. Fhus, an increase in the real value of money holdings promotes
the production of high-Juality goods and reduces the production of lemons.
Fo understand this result, consider rst the Juantities produced in the Iarter economy.
In the Iarter eJuiliIrium, eJuations X1QY and X19Y imply that q&" < q
s
", that is, agent i, 9ho
is more likely to produce lemons than j, produces a larger Juantity than j. Fhe origin
of this ine!ciency is the quid pro quo reJuirementP agent j 9ants to Ie compensated for
the higher risk of receiving lemons. In a Iarter economy, the only 9ay to satisfy this
reJuirement is that i produces a large Juantity of his good X9hich is more likely a lemonY
and that j produces a small Juantity of his good X9hich is more likely of high JualityY.
In contrast, in the monetary economy under the Friedman rule, eJuations X1QY and X19Y
imply that q&" > q
s
"P that is, agent i, 9ho is more likely to produce lemons than j, produces
a smaller Juantity than j.
In order to disentangle the e"ects of money on agents_ Iehavior, 9e 9ill call agent i the
Iuyer, Iecause he spends money, and agent j the seller, Iecause he receives money Xsee
Proposition 1Y. Fhis allo9s us to distinguish an e"ect on the Juantity the Iuyer supplies
and the seller receives Xqs"Y, and an e"ect on the Juantity the seller supplies and the Iuyer
receives Xq&"Y in the match.
22At % # " there eMists a continuum of stationary monetary eJuiliIria 9ith identical terms of trade,
9hich only di"er in their stationary value of '&. *y considering the limit 9hen " ( %, 9e select the
value of '& that is dust su!cient to Iuy the e!cient Juantity "! Xsee *erentsen and Rocheteau 2001Y.
2RIf agent i is not constrained Iy his money holdings, an increase of the real value of money does not
a"ect production and consumption decisions. It only a"ects the amount of money transfered.
1c
<=e rec"gniJabi>it% e!ect "f +"ne% ( $)
s
!
$,#
< 0) In the monetary economy, sellers
can ask to Ie paid 9ith money k an oIdect of universally recogni:aIle Juality k instead
of 9ith goods of uncertain Juality. Fhis possiIility reduces the use of real production
as a means to nance consumption. Cro9ding out of payments 9ith real production Iy
monetary payments is 9hat 9e call the recognizability e!ect of money.
<=e insurance e!ect "f +"ne% ( $)
b
!
$,#
> 0) In the monetary economy, Iuyers can
nance their consumption 9ith money, real production, or Ioth. Fhis possiIility discon-
nects 9hat Iuyers can consume from ho9 they are perceived Iy their trading partners.
In particular, this insurance allo9s lo9-Juality producers to consume even 9hen they are
recogni:ed as lemon producers. In contrast, in a Iarter economy recogni:ed lo9-Juality
producers cannot consume, Iecause they cannot acJuire consumption goods. Fhe presence
of this aconsumptionb insurance in the monetary economy is 9hat 9e call the insurance
e!ect of money.
In the follo9ing sections 9e 9ill investigate ho9 the recogni:aIility and the insurance
e"ects of money a"ect the adverse selection, the moral ha:ard, and the incentive to acJuire
information.
G !"ne% and ad:erse se>ecti"n
Fhis section investigates ho9 money a"ects the Juality miM and 9elfare 9hen the fraction
! of high-Juality producers is constant and eMogenous.
G.7 (nf"r+ati"n and t=e Dua>it% +ix
Fhe Juality miM is dened as the ratio of high-Juality output to total outputP
+ =
!
!
(
qs"f(%!)f#(%")d%!d%"!
(
qs"f(%!)f(%")d%!d%"
X21Y
We interpret an increase in + as a reduction of the adverse selection proIlem.
Increasing & has t9o e"ects on the Juality miMP First, there is a direct e"ect Iecause
it changes the distriIution of the types of meetings.24 Second, there is an indirect e"ect
Iecause a change in & modies the real value of money and the terms of trade. In the Iarter
economy there is the direct e"ect only, 9hich is strictly positive for the Williamson-Wright
information structure, i.e., increasing & increases the Juality miM in the Iarter economy.
24In Section 2.2 9e have sho9n that an increase in ' corresponds to a mean-preserving increase in the
spread of the distriIution F !#", and this k all other things eJual k directly a"ects (.
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In the monetary economy Ioth e"ects arise. Fhus, to analy:e the overall e"ect on +
one has to take into account ho9 the real value of money holdings and the terms of trades
are a"ected in all matches 9hen & changes. *ecause this cannot Ie done analytically, 9e
consider the e"ect of a change in & Iy means of simulations for the information structure
of Williamson and Wright X1994Y. Figure 1 displays the fraction of high-Juality output +
as a function of & for the Friedman rule Xone percent deationY, for price staIility, for ve
and ten percent ination, and for the Iarter economy 9hen ! = 0.1.
A roIust feature of all our simulations is that the ratio + is increasing in & for any
value of ! and for any ination rate. Fhus, as eMpected, if the information proIlem gets
more severe, the Juality miM deteriorates. Note that if & = 0, + = !P If no information is
availaIle, all meetings are of type % = (!,!) and the traders eMchange the same Juantities.
ConseJuently, the ratio of high-Juality output to total output is !. In contrast, if & = 1,
+ = 1P When lemon producers are recogni:ed 9ith certainty, only high-Juality goods 9ill
Ie produced, and conseJuently the ratio of high-Juality output to total output is 1.25
0.2 0.4 0.% 0.& 1
0.2
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0.&
1
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Figure 1P Information and the Juality miM.
From Figure 1 one can see that lo9ering ination improves the Juality miM +. Fhus,
ghting ination reduces the adverse selection proIlem. eur simulations also suggest
that the Friedman rule is the optimal monetary policy 9hen the fraction of high-Juality
producers, !, is given. Note that the insurance e"ect of money has a strictly positive
25Fhe envelope condition X20Y implies that if ' # $, '& # $. If all agent are uninformed, traders are
in the same position 9hen they Iargain, and they need no money to compensate each other. In contrast,
if ' # &, agents recogni:e each other in each match, and conseJuently $+ # $ 9ith proIaIility & $ ! and
$+ # & 9ith proIaIility !. Fhere are no9 asymmetric meetings 9here agents di"er Iy their 9illingness to
trade.
1Q
impact on + Iecause it increases the production of high-Juality goods. Fhe recogni:aIility
e"ect has a positive impact too, Iecause it reduces the production of lo9-Juality goods.
Fo summari:e the previous discussion, note that there are t9o 9ays to increase the
Juality miM +P Iy increasing information for some given ination rate, 9hich corresponds
to a movement along one of the curves in Figure 1, or Iy decreasing ination for some
given information level, 9hich corresponds to a movement across the curves in Figure 1.
Fhus, money and information are substitutes in the sense that Ioth improve the Juality
miM.
G.9 (nf"r+ati"n and we>fare
In this section 9e rst compare the outcome of the decentrali:ed economy 9ith the alloca-
tion that a social planner 9ould choose. After this 9e look at ho9 an increase in the level
of information & or a change in the gro9th rate of the money supply a"ect 9elfare.
In appendiM A4 9e demonstrate that a social planner that maMimi:es the representative
household_s 9elfare chooses the terms of trade such that
q&" = q
! %% # E
9here q! satises u!(q!) = 1. Fhis condition states that 9elfare is maMimi:ed if, in each
match, the agents produce and eMchange the same Juantities q!. Fhere is no 9elfare loss or
gain 9hen lo9-Juality producers produce, Iecause production of lemons costs nothing and
consumption of lemons provides no utility. ConseJuently, the planner reJuires everyIody
to produce as if he 9ere a high-Juality producer. Notice that the rst Iest outcome cannot
Ie reached, Iecause under the Friedman rule X# ( !Y agents eMchange the Juantities q&!"
and qs!" , 9here q
&!
" , q
s!
" < q
! %%. Fhus, in a market 9ith private information, even under the
Friedman rule, 9hich is the optimal monetary policy in this environment, agents produce
too little relative to 9hat a social planner 9ould dictate.
We no9 consider Iy means of simulations ho9 an increase in the level of information as
measured Iy & a"ects 9elfare. Figure 2 displays 9elfare Xa household_s lifetime utilityY as
a function of & for the Friedman rule Xone percent deationY, for ve, ten, and fty percent
ination, and for the Iarter economy for ! = 0.1.
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Figure 2P Ination and 9elfare.
In a monetary economy, if ination is not too high, 9elfare is strictly increasing in the level
of information & Xsee Figure 2Y. In contrast, in the Iarter economy, if , is not too large,
9elfare is decreasing in &.2c Fo see 9hy, note that in the Iarter economy an increase in &
has t9o e"ects. en the one hand, lemon producers are more often recogni:ed and no trade
takes placel on the other hand, there are more matches Iet9een recogni:ed high-Juality
producers in 9hich agents produce large Juantities for each other. Fo see this, note that in
Figure 2, 9hich is dra9n for ! = 0.1, if & = 1, only one percent of the meetings generate
a trade. In contrast, if & = 0, in each meeting the traders produce and consume, although
the Juantities are small relative to the Juantities in a match 9here Ioth traders recogni:ed
each other as high-Juality producers.
Finally, for any value of &, the Friedman rule maMimi:es 9elfare. Note also that under
the Friedman rule, 9hen & approaches 1, the economy attains the rst IestP in each match
9ith a high-Juality producer, the high-Juality producer trades q! either for money or for
q! units of another high-Juality good.
L !"ne% and +"ra> =aJard
In the previous section 9e have seen that an increase in the real value of money improves
the Juality miM and 9elfare. In this section 9e investigate ho9 money a"ects households
incentives to produce high-Juality goods Iy endogeni:ing and comparing the fraction of
high-Juality producers, !, in the Iarter and the monetary economy. Fhroughout this
2cRecall that for all simulations 9e use the utility function !"!"! that has elasticity of suIstitution
!&$ !""!. If households are not eager to smooth consumption across their memIers or across time Xif !
is largeY, 9elfare in the Iarter eJuiliIrium is increasing in '.
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section 9e consider the information structure of Williamson and Wright X1994Y, Iecause
this allo9s us to relate in an easy 9ay the endogenous fraction ! to the severity of the
information proIlem, represented Iy the parameter &.
L.7 <=e pr"gra+ "f t=e ="use=">d
When the representative household h chooses the fraction of its memIers that are high-
Juality producers, *, it takes the average decision of other households, !, as given. *y
choosing memIer i to Ie either a high- or a lo9-Juality producer, the household determines
the distriIution of proIaIilities for the Ieliefs %" X%" is ho9 i_s production is assessed Iy
i_s trading partnerY. If i is a high-Juality producer, the distriIution is given Iy f#(%"),
and if i is a lemon producer, the distriIution is given Iy f$(%"). Note that these t9o
distriIutions depend on ! only, Iecause the choice of * Iy a household is assumed to Ie
private information.
Fhe chronology of events 9ithin a period is as follo9s. First, the household divides its
money holdings evenly across its memIers. Again, Iecause all the household_s memIers
have the same level of money holdings, there is no signaling through 9ealth. Second, it
chooses the proIaIility * at 9hich each of its memIer 9ill Ie a high-Juality producer in
the market. After agents have left the household Iut Iefore they are matched, they receive
a technology shock that lasts one period. Fhe technology shock endo9s a given memIer
9ith the high-Juality technology 9ith proIaIility *. Fhird, the memIers are matched at
random 9ith memIers from other households. When matched, memIers cannot produce
another Juality than the one that has Ieen assigned to them Iy the technology shock.
Fhe derivative D of the right-hand side of X14Y 9ith respect to * eJuals
D(!) =P&"i*"j'""#*!*"#2 %%!u "q&"#$ qs" $ x"$& f(%!)f#(%")
$P&"i*"j'""#*!*"#2 %%!u "q&"#$ x"$& f(%!)f$(%") X22Y
Fhe optimal choice of * Iy the household satises
* = 1 if D(!) > 0
* = 0 if D(!) < 0 X2RY
* # '0, 1( other9ise
L.9 M%++etric eDui>ibriu+
We look for symmetric Nash eJuiliIria 9here all households choose the same fraction of
high-Juality producers. Fhe valueXsY of ! that sustain a symmetric Nash eJuiliIrium are
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dened as follo9sP
! = 1 if D(1) & 0
! = 0 if D(0) ' 0
D(!) = 0 other9ise
X24Y
In the follo9ing 9e call an eJuiliIrium 9ith a positive production of high-Juality goods, i.e.,
! > 0, an active eJuiliIrium. An active eJuiliIrium can Ie either a Iarter or a monetary
eJuiliIrium. In a Iarter eJuiliIrium, $ = 0 in eJuation X22Y.
Fe!niti"n 9 An active equilibrium is a
,
(q&", q
s
", x", )
-
""( satisfying (16), an $ satisfying
(17), and a ! > 0 satisfying (24).
In the follo9ing proposition 9e characteri:e the Iarter eJuiliIrium and the monetary
eJuiliIrium under the Friedman rule # ( !. Note that under the Friedman rule, traders
are never constrained Iy their money holdings.
Hr"p"siti"n 9 Assume that the fraction of high-quality producers, !, is endogenous.
Then the following is true:
(i) If & = 0, the unique equilibrium is nonactive.
(ii) For all & > 0, a nonactive and an active barter equilibrium exist. An active barter
equilibrium with ! = 1 exists i! & & &- = )#.&)#' < 1.
(iii) Under the Friedman rule # ( !, there exists an active monetary equilibrium i!
0 < & < &/ =
%)#
.&)#'!)# < 1. The equilibrium is unique, and the fraction of high-quality
producers is strictly increasing in &.
Hr""fI See appendiM.¥
According to Proposition 2, there is al9ays a nonactive Iarter eJuiliIriumP if a house-
hold eMpects all other households to produce lemons, a Iest response is to choose * = 0.27
If agents receive no information prior to the Iargaining X& = 0Y, there is no active eJuiliI-
rium. For all & > 0 there is also an active Iarter eJuiliIrium. Koreover, if the fraction of
informed agents is su!ciently large X& & &-Y, a Iarter eJuiliIrium eMists 9here all agents
produce high-Juality goods.
Under the Friedman rule there eMists a uniJue active monetary eJuiliIrium if & is not too
large. If the proIaIility of Ieing recogni:ed is high, then agents have no incentive to cheat
and money is valueless. In accordance 9ith intuition, if a monetary eJuiliIrium eMists,
the fraction of high-Juality producers is strictly increasing in the level of information &.
27When ' > $, nonactive Iarter eJuiliIria are unstaIle in the follo9ing senseP If a household anticipates
that a small fraction of agents in the market 9ill produce high Juality, its Iest response is to set # # &.
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Nevertheless, in Fredos X1999Y andWilliamson andWright X1994Y an increase in information
sometimes decrease the fraction of high-Juality producers.2Q
Fhe follo9ing proposition ranks the Iarter and monetary eJuiliIria 9ith respect to the
endogenous fraction of high-Juality producers in the market.
Hr"p"siti"n A Assume # ( !. Then, if & is close to 0, the fraction of high-quality
producers is larger in the monetary equilibrium than in any barter equilibrium. If & #
(&-, &/), it is lower in the monetary equilibrium than in the barter equilibrium.
Hr""fI See appendiM.¥
According to Proposition R, money has amIiguous e"ects on the incentives to produce
lemons. If the proIlem of information is severe X& < &-Y, the fraction of high-Juality
producers is larger in a monetary economy. Fhus, if information is scarce, valued at money
disciplines producers. In contrast, if the information proIlem is not severe X& # (&-, &/)Y,
then there is a uniJue active Iarter eJuiliIrium 9here everyone produces high Juality, and
there is a uniJue monetary eJuiliIrium 9here only a fraction of producers produce lemons
Xsee Figure RY. ConseJuently, if & # (&-, &/), money can Ie valued even though that it is
strictly 9elfare-decreasing.
L.A N>"sed f"r+ s">uti"ns
In this section 9e adopt the iso-elasticity utility function u(q) = ,#"q% 9ith 0 < , < 1,
9hich allo9s us to derive closed form solutions for the endogenous fraction of high-Juality
producers in the Iarter and in the monetary economy under the Friedman rule. Fhe
elasticity of suIstitution of consumption across household memIers is given Iy (1$,)#".29
Hr"p"siti"n G Assume u(q) = ,#"q%, 0 < , < 1, and # ( !. Then, for & > 0, there is
a unique active barter equilibrium where the fraction of high-quality producers is
!- =
/
& (1$ ,)
(1$ &),
0 (1"")(1+")
"
if & < &- = ,
= 1 otherwise
2QFhere are more results that di"er from Fredos X1999Y and Williamson and Wright X1994Y. First, under
the Friedman rule 9e have an uniJue monetary eJuiliIrium, 9hile those authors nd multiple monetary
eJuiliIria. Second, if all agents produce high Juality, no monetary eJuiliIrium eMists in our model, 9hile
there eMist monetary eJuiliIria in those papers. In Fredos X1999Y this is so Iecause there are also single
coincidence meetings. In Williamson and Wright X1994Y there is a monetary eJuiliIrium 9here sellers are
indi"erent Iet9een trading and not trading the good for money.
29Fhis eMpression is also the intertemporal elasticity of suIstitution of a memIer chosen at random.
2R
For all 0 < & < &/ = %%"!% , there is a unique active monetary equilibrium where the fraction
of high-quality producers is
!/ =
/
& (1$ ,)
2, (1$ &)
0"#%
Hr""f P See appendiM.¥
Proposition 4 not only conrms Proposition 2, Iut it also estaIlishes the uniJueness of
the active Iarter eJuiliIrium 9hen u(q) = ,#"q%. It is illustrated in Figure R for , = 0./.
Fhe grey curve laIelled !- represents the fraction of high-Juality producers in the Iarter
economy, and the solid Ilack curve laIelled !/ the fraction of high-Juality producers in
the monetary economy under the Friedman rule. Note that they are Ioth strictly increasing
in the level of information & until they eventually hit the upper Iound ! = 1.R0
Corollary 1 compares the fraction of high-Juality producers in the Iarter and in the
monetary eJuiliIrium under the Friedman rule.
N"r">>ar% 7 De!ne & = %
%"&"#%'!% . Then, 0 < & < &- < &/ . Moreover, the fraction of
high-quality producers can be ranked as follows:
If & < &, then !/ > !-.
If & # "&, &/#, then !/ < !-.
If & > &/ , then !- = 1 and there is no monetary equilibrium.
Hr""f P See appendiM.¥
According to Corollary 1 Xsee also Figure RY, there is a threshold & such that if & < &,
money increases the incentive to produce high Juality, 9hereas if & > &, it increases the
incentive to cheat. Note that & is increasing in ,. Fhus, money is a less e"ective device to
alleviate the moral ha:ard proIlem in an economy, 9here households have a high aversion
to ineJualities across memIers, Iecause the desire to smooth consumption across memIers
already disciplines households.
R0Note also that in Ioth the Iarter and the monetary eJuiliIrium, an increase in ! increases the fraction
of high-Juality producers for small values of ' and reduces the fraction of high-Juality producers for large
values.
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Figure RP Incentive to produce Juality.
L.G !"ra> =aJard
Fhe key result in the previous suIsection is that the fraction of high-Juality producers can
Ie smaller in the monetary eJuiliIrium. In this suIsection 9e sho9 that this is so Iecause
the recognizability e!ect of money and the insurance e!ect of money have countervailing
implications for a household_s incentive to cheat.
<=e rec"gniJabi>it% e!ect Fhe recogni:aIility e"ect of money raises an agent_s incen-
tive to Ie a high Juality producer. In the monetary economy, 9hen a high-Juality producer
does not recogni:e his trading partner, he can ask to Ie paid 9ith money instead of Ieing
paid 9ith a good of uncertain Juality. In contrast, in the Iarter economy high-Juality
producers are al9ays paid 9ith commodities of uncertain Juality. Accordingly, the recog-
ni:aIility e"ect of money improves the gains from trade for high-Juality producers, 9hich
induces households to choose a larger fraction of high-Juality producers.
<=e insurance e!ect In contrast, the insurance e"ect of money raises agents_ incentive
to engage in opportunistic Iehavior, Iecause it allo9s lo9-Juality producers to consume
even 9hen they are recogni:ed as lemon producers. Fhis consumption insurance induces
households to choose riskier Iehavior Iy increasing the fraction of lo9-Juality producers
compared to their choices in the Iarter eJuiliIrium.R1
R1In an overlapping generations model 9here agents have private information aIout their investment
activities, Titaga9a X2001Y sho9s that money can Ie 9elfare-decreasing Iecause of a moral ha:ard proIlem.
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Which e"ect dominates depends on the severity of the information proIlem. When
& is lo9, the recogni:aIility e"ect dominates and the fraction of high-Juality producers
is larger in the monetary eJuiliIrium than in the Iarter eJuiliIrium. As the level of
information increases, the recogni:aIility e"ect fades a9ay, and eventually the insurance
e"ect dominates the recogni:aIility e"ect, 9hich results in a larger fraction of high-Juality
producers in the Iarter eJuiliIrium than in the monetary eJuiliIrium for intermediate
values of &. ConseJuently, the insurance e"ect of money eMacerIates the moral ha:ard
proIlem.
In order to isolate the positive e"ect of money on the incentive to produce high Juality,
9e eliminate the insurance e"ect Iy introducing the follo9ing trading restrictionP house-
holds memIers refuse to trade if they discover that their partner is a lo9-Juality producer.R2
Under this rule, lo9-Juality producers cannot Ienet from the insurance services of money
9hen they are recogni:ed, Iecause they cannot trade. In appendiM AQ 9e sho9 that in this
restricted trade environment, money unamIiguously increases the fraction of high-Juality
producers. ConseJuently, it is the insurance e"ect of money that is responsiIle for the fact
that the fraction of lemon producers can Ie larger in the monetary eJuiliIrium than in
the Iarter eJuiliIrium. Fhis can Ie seen in Figure R, 9here the dotted curve laIelled !0
represents the fraction of high-Juality producers in the restricted trade eJuiliIrium under
the Friedman rule.
Finally, 9e have also eMplored the relationship Iet9een ination, information, and
the endogenous fraction of high-Juality producers ! Iy means of simulations.RR All our
simulations suggest that the results 9e have oItained under the Friedman rule # ( ! are
roIust. For eMample, 9e al9ays nd that for small value of & money alleviates the lemon
proIlem, 9hereas for large values of & the fraction of cheaters is larger in the monetary
eJuiliIrium. ene di"erence, ho9ever, is that there are al9ays t9o monetary eJuiliIria
9hen & # (&-, &/). Note also that 9hen the ination rate Iecomes very large, the fraction
of high-Juality producers in the monetary economy approaches asymptotically the fraction
of high-Juality producers in the Iarter economy.
O (nf"r+ati"n acDuisiti"n
In the previous sections, the information availaIle to the households has Ieen an eMogenous
parameter. In reality, ho9ever, agents have several 9ays to acJuire information aIout the
Juality of the commodities they Iuy. Fhis section analy:es ho9 money a"ects agents_
Note, ho9ever, that the moral ha:ard proIlem in Titaga9a X2001Y is Juite di"erent from the one 9e treat.
R2We simply assume this restriction here. Uo9ever, one could imagine a society 9here people are simply
so o"ended 9hen they discover that an agent is a cheater that they do not 9ant to trade.
RRFhe simulations are availaIle Iy reJuest.
2c
incentives to acJuire information.
Follo9ing Tim X199cY, 9e introduce information acJuisition Iy assuming that at the
Ieginning of each period households have the opportunity to invest in a costly inspection
technology, 9hich is eJually shared Iy all household memIers. AcJuiring this technology
costs C(&).R4 It allo9s each memIer to recogni:e the Juality of a commodity 9ith proIaIil-
ity &. Fhe acJuired inspection technology fully depreciates after one period. Accordingly,
households Iear the cost C(&) in each period. Fhe cost of this inspection technology has
the follo9ing propertiesP C !(.) & 0, C !!(.) > 0, C(0) = 0, C !(0) = 0. An eMplicit form 9e
consider is C(&) = A&
2
%
9ith A > 0.
Fhe choice of & a"ects ho9 the memIers of households h assess the Juality produced Iy
their trading partners. Consider memIer i, and denote Iy f(%!, &) the density function of
%!, 9here %! is i_s Ielief aIout the Juality of the good produced Iy his partner in the match.
1enote Iy f&(%!, &) the partial derivative of f(%!, &) 9ith respect to &. Note that Ieliefs
of i_s trading partners only depend on other households_ information choices, denoted Iy
$. Accordingly, 9e denote Iy f$(%"0$) and f#(%"0$) the conditional distriIutions of the
Ieliefs of i_s partners.
O.7 <=e pr"gra+ "f t=e ="use=">d
Fhe program of household h is analogous to the program X14Y apart from an additional
term reecting the cost of the inspection technology and the fact that the distriIution of
Ieliefs of the household depends on its information choice. For simplicity, 9e assume that
the terms of trade, the marginal value of money, and the fraction of high-Juality producers
are at their eJuiliIrium level that 9e derived in the previous sections. Fhe choice of
information of the household is then given Iy the follo9ing program, 9here 9e have taken
into account the fact that * = !. From X2Y and X14Y 9e get
V (m) = )*+
&
!"# 1
&"i*"j'""#*!*"#2
%
%!u
"
q&"
#$ %"qs"& f(%!0 &)f(%"0$)$ C(&) + !V (m!")
$%& X25Y
s.t. m!" $m = " $
1
&"i*"j'""#*!*"#2
x"f(%!0 &)f(%"0$)
and X12Y and X1RY
R4In Tim X199cY lo9-Juality producers, high-Juality producers, and money holders di"er in their invest-
ments in the inspection technology.
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*y di"erentiating the right-hand side of X25Y 9ith respect to & 9e oItain the rst-order
condition that determines the choice of &. 1ene the function I(&,$) as
I(&,$) =
1
&"i*"j'""#*!*"#2
%
%!u
"
q&"
#$ %"qs" $ x"$& f&(%!0 &)f(%"0$)$ C !(&) X2cY
Note that I(&,$) is a decreasing function of &. Accordingly, household h_s optimal choice
of information is
& = 1 if I(1,$) > 0
& = 0 if I(0,$) < 0 X27Y
I(&,$) = 0 other9ise
O.9 M%++etric eDui>ibriu+
We consider symmetric Nash eJuiliIria 9here all households choose the same information
level and the same fraction of high-Juality producersP * = ! and & = $. For a given !,
$ # '0, 1( sustains a symmetric Nash eJuiliIrium if and only if
I(1, 1) & 0 if $ = 1
I(0, 0) ' 0 if $ = 0 X2QY
I($,$) = 0 if $ # (0, 1'
Fe!niti"n A An active equilibrium is a
,
(q&", q
s
", x", )
-
""( satisfying (16), an $ satisfying
(17), a ! > 0 satisfying (24), and a $ satisfying (28).
6e++a 7 In a symmetric equilibrium, households never invest in a perfect information
technology ($ < 1), and there is always a positive fraction of low-quality producers (! < 1).
Hr""f. See appendiM.¥
Fhe intuition of this result is clear. If all agents produce high-Juality goods, there is no
reason to acJuire informationl hence, households choose to Ie uninformed. *ut if everyone
is uninformed, noIody is producing high-Juality goods.
Proposition 5 descriIes the optimal choice of information for the Iarter and for the
monetary economy under the Friedman rule 9hen the fraction of high-Juality producers,
!, is given.
Hr"p"siti"n L Assume that the level of information, $, is endogenous, and that u(q) =
,#"q% and C !!! (&) & 0. Then for given ! the following is true:
(i) In the barter economy, the level of information is a function $- (!) such that $- (!) >
2Q
0 for all ! # (0, 1) and $- (0) = $- (1) = 0.
(ii) In the monetary economy under the Friedman rule, the level of information is a function
$/ (!) such that $/ (!) > 0 for all ! # (0, 1), $/ (0) = 0, and 12)!$"$/ (!) = 0.
(iii) If ! is close to 0, $/ (!) > $- (!).
Hr""f. See appendiM.¥
Proposition 5 descriIes the level of information as a function of ! in the Iarter and
in the monetary economy under the Friedman rule. It is illustrated in Figure 4 for the
utility function u (q) = 2
)
q and the cost function C (&) = 0.2&
2
%
. Fhe curves laIelled $-
and $/ represent the eJuiliIrium value of & as a function of !. In the Iarter and in the
monetary eJuiliIrium, households stop to invest in information if either ! is close to 0 or
it is close to 1. Fhe reason for this is that if all agents are uniform Xif either all agents are
high-Juality producers or if all are lemon producersY, the return of information is small.
In contrast, the heterogeneity among agents, and conseJuently the return of investments
in information, reaches a maMimum at some intermediate value of !.
Figure 4P Information aJuisition as a function of !.
Figure 4 suggests that k in contrast to 9hat is claimed in *runner and Kelt:er X1971Y
and Ting and Plosser X19QcY k for some given ! households invest more in information in
the monetary eJuiliIrium than in the Iarter eJuiliIrium. Uo9ever, in this respect Figure
4 is partly misleading, Iecause m depending on the specication of the utility function and
the values for ! m the opposite can happen if ! is large.R5
Fo improve our understanding of the role of money on the incentive to acJuire informa-
tion, 9e again look ho9 the recognizability e!ect and the insurance e!ect of money a"ect
the decision to acJuire information.
R5Fhis can occur if ! is large. For instance, if ! # $#-, then for large values of !, ",!!" > "- !!".
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<=e rec"gniJabi>it% e!ect Recall that in the monetary economy sellers can ask to Ie
paid 9ith money rather than 9ith a good of uncertain Juality. Fhis possiIility a"ects the
terms of trade and the incentive to acJuire information. For eMample, consider a high-
Juality producer Xthe sellerY 9ho is matched 9ith a lo9-Juality producer Xthe IuyerY. In
the Iarter economy, for the seller the gain from Ieing informed is the disutility he saves Iy
not producing. In contrast, in the monetary economy the gain is the additional amount
of money he receives. Whether the gain from Ieing informed in the monetary economy
is larger than the gain in the Iarter economy depends on the specication of the utility
function. If households are eager to smooth consumption across their memIers or across
time Xif , is smallY, the additional units of money received in the monetary economy are
more valuaIle than the saved production cost in the Iarter economy. Fhe opposite is true
if the elasticity of suIstitution is large Xif , is largeY. Fhe dependence of this e"ect on the
parameter , leads to the amIiguity of the results in Proposition 4.
<=e insurance e!ect Fhe ainsurance to consumeb provides higher incentives to identify
the Juality of goods. Fo see this, consider a recognized lo9-Juality producer. In the Iarter
economy, he has no Ienet of Ieing informed, Iecause he cannot trade, and accordingly
information is useless to him. In contrast, in the monetary economy he has a Ienet,
Iecause information reduces the proIaIility that he spends money for lemons.
Proposition 5 characteri:es the Iarter eJuiliIrium and the monetary eJuiliIrium under
the Friedman rule for the Juadratic cost function C(&) = A&
2
%
9hen Ioth ! and $ are
endogenous.
Hr"p"siti"n O Assume that ! and $ are endogenous, and that u(q) = ,#"q% and C(&) =
A&
2
%
. Then there is threshold A = (1$ ,) 1"2 (1 + ,) 1"2#" such that the following is true:
(i) If A > A, no active barter equilibrium existsO if A = A, there exists a unique active
barter equilibriumO and if A < A, two active barter equilibria exist.
(ii) Under the Friedman rule, there exists a unique active monetary equilibrium for all
values of A.
Hr""f. See appendiM.¥
Proposition c is illustrated in Figure 5 for , = 0./ Xrst columnY and , = 0.3/ Xsecond
columnY. It sho9s the endogenous fraction ! of high-Juality producers, the endogenous
level of information $, and 9elfare as functions of A for the Iarter economy Xgrey curvesY
and the monetary economy XIlack curvesY. Fhe dotted curve represents the critical value
A.
As stated in Proposition c, if A > A, no Iarter eJuiliIrium eMists, 9hereas if A < A,
t9o Iarter eJuiliIria eMist. Fhis multiplicity of eJuiliIria reects a self-fullling mechanism
that can generate coordination failures. An increase in the cost of the inspection technology
R0
Xan increase in AY has di"erent conseJuences in the t9o eJuiliIria. In the high eJuiliIrium
Xthe eJuiliIrium 9ith a high ! and a high $Y, it leads to a decrease in the fraction of
agents that produce high Juality and a decrease in the fraction of informed agents. In the
lo9 eJuiliIrium Xthe eJuiliIrium 9ith a lo9 ! and a lo9 $Y, the opposite happens.
In contrast, in the monetary economy under the Friedman rule, there eMists a uniJue
active monetary eJuiliIrium for all values of A. ConseJuently, 9hen the information proI-
lem is su!ciently severe XA > AY, this is the only active eJuiliIrium. Fhis illustrates the
strong spillover e"ect Iet9een the incentive to produce high Juality and the information
choice in the monetary eJuiliIrium. Furthermore, the monetary eJuiliIrium has the same
properties as the high Iarter eJuiliIrium.
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Figure 5P !, $, and 9elfare as functions of A.
eur simulations suggest that 9elfare, the fraction of high-Juality producers, and the
level of information are most often higher in the monetary eJuiliIrium under the Friedman
R1
rule than in the Iarter eJuiliIrium. Fhis is certainly true for those values of A 9here no
active Iarter eJuiliIrium eMists XA > AY. Uo9ever, 9e nd that this is also true for A < A
if , is not too large Xour simulations suggest if , is smaller than 0.9Y. As an illustration, see
the case , = 0./ in gure 5. Fhus, for most parameter values our model does not support
the claim of *runner and Kelt:er X1971Y, Ting and Plosser X19QcY, and Tim X199cY that
money and information acJuisition are suIstitutes. Rather, it suggests that they are most
often complements. Koreover, our model does not support the 9idely held Ielief that the
Ienet of money comes from its aIility to save information costs.
Nonetheless, for large values of , and very small values ofA Xsee the case , = 0.3/ 9here
A = 0.04 in Figure 5Y, our model eMhiIits results that are in accordance 9ith the previously
mentioned papers. Indeed, if , is very large and A very small, XapproMimately A = 0.056Y,
the fraction of high-Juality producers andjor the level of information can Ie smaller, and
9elfare higher in the monetary eJuiliIrium under the Friedman rule. Fhis suggests that
the 9elfare gain for these parameter values could come from saving information costs.
P N"nc>usi"n
We have investigated the role of at money in environments 9here producers have private
information aIout the Juality of the goods they supply. In such environments three issues
are at the centre stageP adverse selection, moral ha:ard, and the incentive to acJuire costly
information. In order to discuss these issues, 9e have rst studied ho9 money modies the
Juantities produced and eMchanged in Iilateral meetings.
We have identied t9o e"ects of money on these Juantities. Fhe recognizability e!ect
of money states that money cro9ds out real goods payments. Fhe origin of this e"ect is
that agents prefer to Ie paid 9ith money m an oIdect of universally recogni:ed Juality m
rather than 9ith goods of uncertain Juality, and this desire gives rise to an endogenous role
for money. It is this reduction of uncertainty, that, at least since Kenger X1Q92Y, has Ieen
considered to Ie an important advantage of monetary eMchange over Iarter. Fhe insurance
e!ect of money states that money cro9ds in consumption. Fhe origin of this e"ect is that
money provides insurance Iy disconnecting the Juantities that agents can Iuy from ho9
they are assessed Iy their trading partners. In particular, this insurance allo9s agents to
consume even 9hen they are recogni:ed as lo9-Juality producers.
eur models supports the notion that money is a device for overcoming the adverse
selection proIlem. When the fraction of high-Juality producers and the level of information
are eMogenous, money promotes the production of high-Juality goods and reduces the
production of lemons. Fhese changes in production increase 9elfare unamIiguously. In
contrast, 9hen the fraction of high-Juality producers is endogenous, money can Ie 9elfare-
R2
decreasing. Fhis is so Iecause 9hile the recognizability e!ect of money raises the Ienet of
Ieing a high-Juality producer, the insurance e!ect of money increases the Ienet of Ieing a
lemon producer. If the information proIlem is not severe, the insurance e"ect dominates the
recogni:aIility e"ect, and conseJuently the fraction of high-Juality producers and 9elfare
are lo9er in the monetary economy. Fhus, valued at money sometimes eMacerIates the
moral ha:ard proIlem.
Interestingly, 9hen Ioth the fraction of high-Juality producers and the information
level are endogenous, the level of information and 9elfare are most often larger in the
monetary economy. Fhe reason for this result is the insurance e"ect of money. With a
valued money, Iuyers consume more, 9hich raises their incentive to acJuire information
in order to identify the Juality of 9hat they consume. Fhis result does not support the
9idely held vie9 X*runner and Kelt:er, 1971l Ting and Plosser, 19Qcl Tim, 199cY that
money has a 9elfare-improving role Iy saving information costs.
1ivisiIility of money has allo9ed us to study ination. In general, 9e nd that ination
is 9elfare-decreasing, Iecause it reduces the real value of money, 9hich adversely e"ects
the Juality of the goods produced and eMchanged. A money that little value is a less useful
device to overcome the adverse selection proIlem than a highly valued money. Nevertheless,
for those parameter values for 9hich money eMacerIates the moral ha:ard proIlem, it is
Ietter to remove it from circulation. 1ivisiIle money has also allo9ed us to focus on
the monetary eJuiliIrium under the Friedman rule, for 9hich 9e have derived several
tractaIle analytical eMpressions. In particular, under the Friedman rule the active monetary
eJuiliIrium is uniJue.
Fhere are several eMtensions to this paper that are 9orth considering. First, it 9ould
Ie interesting to introduce signaling into the model. Wealth Xmoney holdingsY could Ie
modelled as a signaling device. Costly advertising of product Juality is another device.
Second, money is only one possiIle institution to overcome asymmetric information proI-
lems. Intermediaries and middlemen are other institutions 9hose role is to alleviate those
proIlems. Fhird, other assets could Ie vie9ed as alternative to money. Fhe role of credit
in such an economy 9ould Ie 9orth studying. Fourth, throughout the paper 9e have
assumed that money is an oIdect 9hose Juality is identiaIle Iy everyIody. It 9ould Ie
interesting to see ho9 roIust our results are in a model that allo9s for counterfeiting.
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APPEN1In
.7. <=e inf"r+ati"n structure.
In this appendiM 9e descriIe ho9 traders oItain information aIout their partners and
ho9 they form their Ieliefs. When t9o traders i and j meet, each agent receives information
prior to the Iargaining aIout the Juality of the good produced Iy his partner. Fhis
information arrives in the form of t9o signals s!" and s
"
! , 9here s
!
" # {L,H} Xs"! # {L,H} Y
is the signal received Iy agent i XjY aIout the Juality of the good produced Iy agent j XiY.
If s!" = H Xs
!
" = LY, the signal suggests to i that j is a high Xlo9Y Juality producer.
Unfortunately, signals are imperfect. If '! # {L,H} denotes the true nature of agent
i, then signal reliaIility Xor typeY is descriIed Iy the pair (-# , -$) # '0, 1(%, 9here -# and
-$ are dened as follo9sP
-# = "
%
s"! = H |'! = H
&
-$ = "
%
s"! = H |'! = L
&
Fhus, -# is the conditional proIaIility that the signal is H 9hen '! = H and -$ is the
conditional proIaIility that it is H 9hen '! = L. We assume that -# & -$, so that the
signals and the true nature of the Iargaining partners are positively correlated.
After having received a signal, the traders update their Ieliefs aIout their trading
partner. Fhe *ayesian Ieliefs satisfy
"
%
'! = H
22s"! = H & = -#!-#!+ -$ (1$!) & ! X29Y
"
%
'! = H
22s"! = L& = (1$ -#)!(1$ -#)!+ (1$ -$) (1$!) ' ! XR0Y
If -# > -$, the signal reveals some information, i.e., " ''! = H |s! = H ( > !. In contrast,
if -# = -$, then " ''! = H |s! = H ( = " ''! = H |s! = L ( = !.
Fo descriIe the fact that traders are heterogeneous in their aIilities to recogni:e a
certain good, 9e assume that there are many signals that di"er in their reliaIility. In fact,
9e assume that there is a distriIution of signal types 9ith density . (-# , -$). For instance,
if -# = 1 and -$ = 0, the trader is an eMpert in the good produced Iy his partner, and
he is aIle to recogni:e its Juality 9ith certainty. In contrast, if -# = -$, the trader is
ignorant aIout the Juality of the good produced Iy his partner. As sho9n in appendiM
A2, the distriIution of the signals generates a distriIution of Ieliefs %".
.9. Be>ief distributi"ns I F#(u), F$(u), and F (u)
As descriIed in appendiM 1, 9hen an individual meets a partner, he receives a signal aIout
the Juality of his partner_s output. Fhe signal type - = (-# , -$) is a random variaIle
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characteri:ed Iy the density function . (x, y) and dened on " =
,
(x, y) # '0, 1(% |x & y-.
We impose the follo9ing restriction on the density functionP
. (x, x) = . (y, y) , %x, y # '0, 1( XR1Y
Fhis restriction permits us to avoid a discontinuity point in the density functions f#(.),
f$(.), and f(.).
Zet %" # '0, 1( denote the updated Ielief of player j after he has received a signal aIout
the Juality of the output produced Iy player iP
% = 3!#(-)!&1#$#' + 3!$(-)!&1#$$' XR2Y
9here - = (-# , -$) is the signal type, S' # {H,L} the signal received Iy the individual,
and 3!#(-) and 3!$(-) the conditional proIaIilities given Iy X29Y and XR0YP
3!#(-) = -#!
-#!+ -$ (1$!)3!$(-) = (1$ -#)!
(1$ -#)!+ (1$ -$) (1$!)
Note that the signal S' and the updated Ieliefs 3!#(-) and 3!$(-) depend on the signal
type -, 9hich is a random variaIle.
7st step. Fhe distriIution F#(.)
We take the point of vie9 of player i, and 9e determine the distriIution of Ieliefs of i_s
partners aIout i_s output. Fhe function F#(.) descriIes this cumulative distriIution 9hen
i is a high-Juality producerP
F#(u) = " '%" < u |'! = H ( XRRY
9here '! is true type of agent i. *ecause S' = H implies %" & ! and S' = L implies
%" ' !, it is convenient to distinguish Iet9een u > ! and u < !.
Assume rst that u > !. Fhen %" > u is eJuivalent to 3!#(-)!&1#$#' > u. In this case,
it is convenient to compute 1$ F#(u)P
1$ F#(u) = " '%" > u |'! = H (
=
*
"
43!#(-)!&1#$#' > u |- # (dx, dy) ,'! = H 5" '- # (dx, dy) |'! = H (
Note that - and '! are independent random variaIles. ConseJuently,
1$ F#(u) =
*
"
43!#(x, y)!&1x,y$#' > u |'! = H 5" '- # (dx, dy)(
=
*
" 'S+*2 = H |'! = H (!3&.'(x, y). (x, y) dxdy
=
*
x!3&.'(x, y). (x, y) dxdy
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9here
A(u) =
)
(x, y) # "
2222 x!x!+ y (1$!) > u
+
and !3&.'(x, y) is eJual to one if (x, y) # A(u). Finally, this last eJuation can Ie re9ritten
as follo9sP
1$ F#(u) =
* "
#
x
* +/ !u"!
1"!
0
#
. (x, y) dydx %u > ! XR4Y
Assume no9 that u < !. Fhen %" < u is eJuivalent to 3!$(-)!&1#$$' < u. ConseJuently,
9e have
F#(u) = " '%" > u |'! = H (
=
*
"
43!$(-)!&1#$$' < u |- # (dx, dy) ,'! = H 5" '- # (dx, dy) |'! = H (
Using the fact that - and '! are independent, 9e get
F#(u) =
*
"
43!$(x, y)!&1x,y$$' < u |'! = H 5" '- # (dx, dy)(
=
*
" 'S+*2 = L |'! = H (!-&.'(x, y). (x, y) dxdy
=
*
(1$ x)!-&.' (x, y). (x, y) dxdy
9here
B(u) =
)
(x, y) # "
2222 (1$ x)!(1$ x)!+ (1$ y) (1$!) < u
+
Finally, 9e oItain
F#(u) =
* "
#
(1$ x)
* "# (1"x)!
(1"!)
(1"u)
u
#
. (x, y) dydx %u < ! XR5Y
oFrom XR4Y and XR5Y 9e deduce the density function f#(u)P
f#(u) =
* "
#
!
(1$!)
6x
u
7%
.
8
x, x
9
!
.
$!
1$!
:;
dx %u > !, XRcY
=
* "
#
<
1$ x
u
=%
!
1$!.
<
x, 1$ (1$ x)!
(1$!)
(1$ u)
u
=
dx %u < ! XR7Y
Under the restriction XR1Y, the density f#(.) is continuous at u = !.
9nd step. Fhe distriIution F$(.)
Fhe distriIution F$(.) is the distriIution of Ieliefs of i_s partners aIout i_s output 9hen
i is a lo9-Juality producerP
F$(u) = " '%" < u |'! = L ( XRQY
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Similar reasoning to the aIove gives
1$ F$(u) =
* "
#
* +/ !u"!
1"!
0
#
y. (x, y) dydx %u > ! XR9Y
F$(u) =
* "
#
* "# (1"x)!
(1"!)
(1"u)
u
#
(1$ y). (x, y) dydx %u < ! X40Y
1ene % =
%
"
.
$ 1& % !
"#!
&
. Fhen, from XR9Y and X40Y the density function f$(u) satises
f$(u) = %
* "
#
!
(1$!)
6x
u
7%
.
8
x, x
9
!
.
$!
1$!
:;
dx %u > ! X41Y
= %
* "
#
<
1$ x
u
=%
!
1$!.
<
x, 1$ (1$ x)!
(1$!)
(1$ u)
u
=
dx %u < ! X42Y
From XRcY, XR7Y, X41Y, and X42Y 9e deduce the follo9ing relationshipP
u(1$!)f$(u) = (1$ u)!f#(u) %u # '0, 1( X4RY
ConseJuently,
f#(u) > f$(u) %u > !
f#(u) < f$(u) %u < !
Ard step. Fhe distriIution F (u)
Fhe distriIution F (.) represents the distriIution of i_s Ieliefs aIout the Juality of a partner
chosen at randomP
" '%! < u( = "
%
%! < u|'" = H
&
"
%
'" = H
&
+ "
%
%! < u|'" = L
&
"
%
'" = L
&
Fhen
F (u) = !F#(u) + (1$!)F$(u) X44Y
and so
f(u) = !f#(u) + (1$!)f$(u) X45Y
From X4RY and X45Y, 9e have
uf(u) = !f#(u) X4cY
.A. FirstE"rder c"nditi"ns "f t=e ="use=">d pr"gra+
R7
Hart 7. <er+s "f trade 1enote Iy /" and $/" the multipliers associated 9ith con-
straints X12Y. Fhe multipliers associated 9ith constraints X1RY 9ill Ie denoted Iy 0" and$0", respectively. Consider, rst, the rst-order conditions for the high-Juality producersP
%!u
! "q&"# = /" $ 0" + $# %% # E X47Y
%"u
! (qs") =
#
$ + /" $ 0"
%% # E X4QY
/" (m$ x") = 0 %% # E X49Y
0" (M + x") = 0 %% # E X50Y
Fhe rst-order conditions for the high-Juality producers are eMactly the same as in *erentsen
and Rocheteau X2000aY. We therefore do not discuss them here.
Consider, no9, the rst-order conditions for lemon producersP
%!u
! "$q&"# = $/" $ $0" + $# %% # E X51Y
$/" (m$ $x") = 0 %% # E X52Y$0" (M + $x") = 0 %% # E X5RY
Note that in eJuiliIrium, for each % # E,
6$q&", $x", $/",$0"7 = "q&", x",/", 0"#. Indeed, under
the condition $qs" = qs", the eJuations that determine "q&", x",/", 0"#, i.e., eJuations XQY, X47Y,
X49Y, and X50Y, are analogous to the eJuations that determine
6$q&", $x", $/",$0"7, i.e., X9Y, X51Y,
X52Y, and X5RY. ConseJuently, lo9-Juality producer make the same o"ers as high-Juality
producers.
EJuation X1QY follo9s directly from X47Y and X4QY. Fo derive eJuation X19Y note that
in a symmetric eJuiliIrium uppercase variaIles and lo9ercase variaIles are eJualP $ = #,
m = M , and
"
q&", q
s
", x"
#
=
"
Q&", Q
s
",X"
#
for all %. Fhen eJuations XQY and X11Y yield
%"u (q
s
")$ q&" + x"$ = (1$ )")
%
%"u
"
q&"!
#$ qs"! $ x"!$& X54Y
EJuation X54Y and an eJuation that is analogous to X54Y Iut 9here % = (%!, %") is replaced
Iy %! = (%", %!) determine eJuation X19Y. For more details, see *erentsen and Rocheteau
X2000aY.
Hart 9. <=e en:e>"pe c"nditi"n Fhe envelope condition is
$#"
!
=
*
(
%"/" + (1$ %") $/" f(%!)f(%")d%!d%" + $ X55Y
RQ
Faking into account that $/" = /", 9e can re9rite the envelope condition as follo9sP
$#"
!
=
*
(
/" f(%!)f(%")d%!d%" + $
oFrom X47Y, the envelope condition Iecomes
$#"
!
=
*
(
)*+
%
%!u
!(q&")$ $ $, 0
&
f(%!)f(%")d%!d%" + $
and hence
$#" = !
*
(
)*+
%
%!u
!(q&")$,$
&
f(%!)f(%")d%!d%"
Fhe demonstration of the uniJueness of the Iarter and the monetary eJuiliIrium is provided
Iy *erentsen and Rocheteau X2000aY.
.G. <=e pr"gra+ "f t=e s"cia> p>anner
We assume that the social planner cannot oIserve the types of the players in a meeting.Rc
ConseJuently, the terms of trade he chooses must satisfy q&" = $q&". Furthermore, the social
planner treats all households in a similar 9ay. Fherefore, 9hat an individual must produce
if he is in a match of type (%#, %") eJuals 9hat he receives 9hen he is in a match of type
(%", %#), i.e., q&" = q
s
"!.
Fhe social planner maMimi:es the utility in a period of the representative household.
Note that the social planner does not care aIout the money holdings of the household.
Accordingly, the planner solves the follo9ing programP
)*+
)b!*)
s
! *$)b!*$)s! !
*
(
%
%!u
"
q&"
#$ qs"& f(%!)f#(%") d%!d%" + (1$!)*
(
%!u
"$q&"# f(%!)f$(%") d%!d%"
s.t. q&" = q
s
"! and q
&
" = $q&"
*y using the fact that !f#(%") = %"f(%") and (1$!) f$(%$) = (1$ %")f(%"), the program
of the social planner can Ie re9ritten as follo9sP
)*+
)b!*)
s
!
*
(
%
%!u
"
q&"
#$ %"qs"& f(%!)f(%") d%!d%"
s.t. q&" = q
s
"!
Fhis program can Ie re9ritten as
)*+
)b!*)
s
!
*
{&"i*"j'"(#*")2$"i4"j }
%
%!u
"
q&"
#$ %!q&" + %"u (qs")$ %"qs"& f(%!)f(%") d%!d%"
RcFhe assumption that the planner cannot recogni:e the types of the players is not important for this
9elfare criterion. If he could recogni:e their types, he could apply the same rule to maMimi:e 9elfare,
Iecause producing lemons cost nothing and consuming them provides no utility.
R9
1i"erentiating 9ith respect to q&" gives the follo9ing rst-order conditionsP
u!
"
q&"
#
= 1 %% # '0, 1(%
.L. Hr""f "f Hr"p"siti"n 9
EJuation X22Y can Ie re9ritten as follo9sPR7
D(!) =
1
&"i*"j'""#*!*"#2
/
%"
!
%
%!u
"
q&"
#$ qs" $ x"$&$ 1$ %"1$! %%!u "q&"#$ x"$&
0
f(%")f(%!) X5cY
Fhe proof proceeds in siM parts.
Hart 7. F"r a>> & & 0, a n"nacti:e barter eDui>ibriu+ exists. If ! = 0, an agent
9ho is not recogni:ed is perceived as a lo9-Juality producer. Accordingly, Ieliefs are either
0 or 1. In the Iarter economy, a trade takes place Iet9een agents i and j if and only if
%! = %" = 1. Fhus, according to X5cY,
D(0) = %u(q&"*")$ qs"*"& f#(1)f(1)$ u(q&"*")f$(1)f(1)
From X5Y, if ! = 0, f(1) = 0. Fherefore, D(0) = 0. ConseJuently, if ! = 0, the Iest
response of any household is to choose any * # '0, 1(. Fhus, * = ! = 0 is a Med point of
X24Y.
Hart 9. (f & = 0, t=e uniDue eDui>ibriu+ is n"nacti:e. According to X5Y, if & = 0,
then f(!) = 1. Uence, X5cY can Ie re9ritten as follo9sP
D(!) =
(
$qs!*! < 0 if ! > 0
0 if ! = 0
ConseJuently, 9ithout arrival of information the only eJuiliIrium is ! = 0.
Hart A. .n acti:e barter eDui>ibriu+ wit= ! = 1 exists i! & & &- = )#.&)#' . In the
Iarter economy, if one of the traders in a match is recogni:ed as a lo9-Juality producer
Xi.e., %! = 0 or %" = 0Y, then no trade takes place Xi.e., q&" = q
s
" = 0Y. Uence, using X5Y, 9e
can re9rite D(!) as
D(!) = &%! %u "q&"*"#$ qs"*"&+ (1$ &) & %!u "q&!*"#$ qs!*"&
$&! (1$ &) qs"*! $ (1$ &)% qs!*!
X57Y
An eJuiliIrium 9here all traders are high-Juality producers eMists if and only if D(1) & 0.
Using the fact that q&"*" = q
s
"*" = q
!, this condition yields & & &- = )#.&)#' . Note that &- < 1.
R7Note that Iecause !""$!"! $!$*" # $"!$*" and
"$
! $!$*" # $!!$*", the factor in large Irackets is 9ell dened
at ! # $ and ! # &.
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Hart G. F"r a>> & # (0, &-), an acti:e barter eDui>ibriu+ wit= ! < 1 exists. We
rst estaIlish the follo9ing resultP
12)
+$#
u!#"
"
"
+
#
x
= 0
From the strict concavity of the utility function and the fact that u(0) = 0, 9e have
.&+'
+
> u!(x). *ecause u!#"(.) is a decreasing function, 9e have
u!#"
<
u(x)
x
=
< x %x X5QY
Kultiplying each side of the ineJuality X5QY Iy .&+'
+
, 9e oItain
u(x)
x
u!#"
<
u(x)
x
=
< u(x) %x X59Y
1ene 1(x) * +
.&+'
. We have 1!(x) > 0 and 12)+$# 1(x) ' 12)
+$#
"
.!&+' = 0. IneJuality X59Y
can Ie re9ritten as follo9sP
1
1(x)
u!#"
<
1
1(x)
=
< u(x) %x
Faking the limit 9hen x approaches 0 and denoting X = 1(x) 9e have
12)
5$#
1
X
u!#"
<
1
X
=
= 0 Xc0Y
oFrom X1QY and X19Y, qs!*! satises !u
!(qs!*!) = 1. Uence, q
s
!*! = u
!#" " "
!
#
. From Xc0Y 9e
deduce that
12)
!$#
qs!*!
!
= 0 Xc1Y
Since $ = 0 in the Iarter eJuiliIrium, X19Y implies
!u
"
q&!*"
#$ qs!*" = !u! "q&!*"# %u "qs!*"#$ q&!*"& Xc2Y
ConseJuently, D(!) given Iy X57Y can Ie re9ritten as
D(!) = !,&% %u "q&"*"#$ qs"*"&+ (1$ &) &u! "q&!*"# %u "qs!*"#$ q&!*"&
$& (1$ &) qs"*! $ (1$ &)%
)s!,!
!
(
Fhe last t9o terms 9ithin the Iraces go to :ero 9hen ! approaches :ero. Fhe rst term is
strictly positive and independent of !. Fhe limit of the second term 9hen ! approaches
:ero is a priori indeterminate. ConseJuently, in the neighIorhood of ! = 0, D(!) can Ie
approMimated Iy
D(!) ' !,&% %u "q&"*"#$ qs"*"&+ (1$ &) &u! "q&!*"# %u "qs!*"#$ q&!*"&- > 0 %! # (0, 2(
9here 2 is arIitrarily close to :ero.
Furthermore, for all & < &-, D(1) < 0. ConseJuently, 9e deduce from a continuity
argument that for all & < &-, there is a ! # (0, 1' such that D(!) = 0.
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Hart L. Feri:ati"n "f D(!) in t=e +"netar% eDui>ibriu+ w=en # ( !. *erentsen
and Rocheteau X2000Y sho9 that 9hen # ( !, the traders produce and eMchange the
follo9ing JuantitiesP
q&"*" = q
s
"*" = q
&
"*# = q
s
#*" = q
&
"*! = q
s
!*" = q
!
q&!*" = q
s
"*! = q
s
!*! = q
&
!*! = q
&
!*# = q
s
#*! = q
!
!
q&#*# = q
s
#*# = q
&
#*" = q
s
"*# = q
&
#*! = q
s
!*# = q
!
#
9here q! satises u!(q!) = 1, q!! satises !u
!(q!!) = 1, and q
!
# = 0. Koreover, 9hen # ( !,
in each meeting agents use a monetary transfer in order to split the total surplus of the
match evenly. Uence,
x"$ =
%!u
"
q!"i
#$ q!"j $ %"u(q!"j) + q!"i
2
XcRY
For all (%!, %") # {(0,!), (!,!), (1,!)} 9e have
%"
!
%
%!u
"
q&"
#$ qs" $ x"$&$ 1$ %"1$! %%!u "q&"#$ x"$& = $q!! Xc4Y
Furthermore, using the fact that f(0) = &(1 $ !) and f(1) = &! Xsee eJuation X5YY 9e
have1
"j""#*"#
/
%"
!
%
%!u
"
q&"
#$ qs" $ x"$&$ 1$ %"1$! %%!u "q&"#$ x"$&
0
f(%") = & '$q! + (x"i*#$ $ x"i*"$)(
Replacing x"i*#$ and x"i*"$ Iy their eMpression given Iy XcRY, 9e oItain1
"j""#*"#
/
%"
!
%
%!u
"
q&"
#$ qs" $ x"$&$ 1$ %"1$! %%!u "q&"#$ x"$&
0
f(%") = &
<
u (q!)$ q!
2
=
Xc5Y
Using Xc4Y and Xc5Y, X5cY can Ie re9ritten as
D(!) = &
<
u (q!)$ q!
2
=
$ (1$ &) q!! XccY
Hart O. !"netar% eDui>ibriu+ under t=e Fried+an ru>e Note, rst, that for
all & > 0, 9e have D(0) > 0, and that D(!) is strictly decreasing in !. ConseJuently, a
monetary eJuiliIrium 9ith ! < 1 eMists if and only if D(1) < 0. oFrom XccY, this condition
yields
& < &/ =
2q!
u (q!) + q!
Note that &/ < 1 Iecause q! < u (q!). *ecause D(!) is strictly decreasing in !, the mon-
etary eJuiliIrium is uniJue. Note also that XccY implies that in the monetary eJuiliIrium
one has $)
#
!
$&
> 0 and therefore $!M
$&
> 0. Finally, recall that if ! = 1, all meetings are
symmetric and conseJuently money is not valued.
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.O. Hr""f "f Hr"p"siti"n A
We consider the fraction of high-Juality producers X!-Y 9hen & is close to 0. Fhe condition
D(!-) = 0 can Ie re9ritten as
q!!B = &
,
&!-
%
u
"
q&"*"
#$ qs"*"&+ (1$ &) %!-u "q&!B *"#$ qs!B *"&$!- (1$ &) qs"*!B + (& + 2)q!!B-
Xc7Y
From XccY, the fraction of high-Juality producers in the monetary eJuiliIrium X!/Y sat-
ises
q!!M = &
)<
u (q!)$ q!
2
=
+ q!!M
+
XcQY
From Xc7Y and XcQY, if & is close to 0, !- and !/ must also Ie close to :ero. ConseJuently,
u (q!)$ q!
2
+ q!!M '
u (q!)$ q!
2
À
&!-
%
u
"
q&"*"
#$ qs"*"&+ (1$ &) %!-u "q&!B *"#$ qs!B *"&$!- (1$ &) qs"*!B + (& + 2)q!!B ' 0
*ecause q!! is increasing in !, 9e deduce from Xc7Y and XcQY that !/ > !-.
.P. Hr""f "f Hr"p"siti"n G and N"r">>ar% 7
From eJuations X1QY and X19Y, one can verify that the terms of trade in the Iarter eJuiliI-
rium satisfy
qs"*! = !
"
(1"")(1+") , q&"*! = !
1
(1"")(1+") , qs"*" = q
&
"*" = q
! = 1, qs!*! = q
&
!*! = q
!
! = !
1
1""
Xc9Y
SuIstituting these eMpressions into X57Y, 9e oItain
D(!) = &%!
<
1$ ,
,
=
+(1$ &) &! 1(1"")(1+")
<
1$ ,
,
=
$& (1$ &)! "(1"")(1+")!"$(1$ &)%! 11""
X70Y
Fhe condition D(!) = 0 can Ie re9ritten as
&%!
""2
(1"")(1+")
<
1$ ,
,
=
+ (1$ &) &
<
1$ ,
,
=
= & (1$ &)! "1+" + (1$ &)%! "(1"")(1+") X71Y
Fhe ZUS of X71Y is decreasing in ! 9hereas the RUS is increasing in !. Uence, for any &
there is a uniJue ! satisfying X71Y. A solution of X71Y is given Iy
!- =
<
1$ ,
,
&
1$ &
= (1"")(1+")
"
4R
Fhe eMpression for !/ is oItained Iy replacing q!! 9ith !
1
1"" in the rst-order condition
XccY. Finally, note that !- < !/ if and only ifP
& < & * ,
,+ 2% (1$ ,) .
.S. Restricted <rade EDui>ibriu+
Hart 7I N=aracteriJati"n "f t=e restricted trade eDui>ibriu+ Fhe restricted trade
rule species that 9hen a trader in a match is recogni:ed as a lo9-Juality producer X%! = 0
or %" = 0Y, no trade takes place. Fhe program of the household is given Iy X14Y 9hen all
terms 9ith %! = 0 or %" = 0 are eliminated. Fhe choice ! that sustains a symmetric Nash
eJuiliIrium is given IyP
! = 1 if D0(1) & 0
! = 0 if D0(0) ' 0
D0(!) = 0 other9ise
9here D0 is given Iy X22Y 9hen all terms 9ith %! = 0 or %" = 0 are eliminatedP
D0(!) =
%
u
"
q&"*"
#$ qs"*"& &%!$qs"*!&(1$&)!+%!u "q&!*"#$ qs!*" $ x!*"$& (1$&)&$qs!*!(1$&)%
X72Y
Zet us rst determine the necessary and su!cient conditions for an eJuiliIrium 9ithout
lo9-Juality producers. Using the fact that 9hen ! = 1 money is not valued, 9e nd that
D0(1) = D-(1). ConseJuently, a necessary and su!cient condition for an eJuiliIrium
9ithout lemon producers is & & &-.
ef course, the marginal value of money is a"ected Iy the restricted trade rule. Nonethe-
less, under the Friedman rule the constraints on money holdings of households_ memIers
are not Iinding and 9e have
!u
"
q&!*"
#$ qs!*" $ x!*"$ = !u(q!!)$ q!! + u(q!)$ q!2
ConseJuently, X72Y can Ie re9ritten as follo9sP
D0(!) = &%! 'u (q!)$ q!(+&(1$&)
)
!u(q!!)$ q!! + u(q!)$ q!
2
+
$(1$&)!&q!!$q!!(1$&)%
X7RY
Zet us consider eJuiliIria 9ith ! # (0, 1). Fhen 9e have D0(!) = 0. For all & # (0, &-)
9e have D0(0) > 0 and D0(1) < 0. ConseJuently, an active monetary eJuiliIrium eMists.
Hart 9I N"+paris"n "f t=e barter eDui>ibriu+ and t=e restricted trade eDui>ibE
riu+. According to X57Y, in the Iarter eJuiliIrium
D(!) = &%! 'u(q!)$ q!( + & (1$ &) %!u(q&!*")$ qs!*"&$ (1$ &)!&qs"*! $ (1$ &)%q!! X74Y
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Fo demonstrate that the fraction of high-Juality producers in the restricted trade eJuiliI-
rium is larger than in any Iarter eJuiliIrium, 9e can sho9 that D0(!) $ D-(!) > 0 for
any !. From X7RY and X74Y, 9e get
D0(!)$D-(!) = &(1$&)
)
!u(q!!)$ q!! + u(q!)$ q!
2
$ %!u(q&!*")$ qs!*"&$!q!! +!qs"*!+
X75Y
*erentsen and Rocheteau X2000aY sho9 that in the Iarter eJuiliIrium in asymmetric
matches, qs"*! > q
!
!. Koreover, for all ! # (0, 1), in a (!, 1)-meeting, the Iuyer surplus is
strictly smaller than the seller surplusP
!u(q&!*")$ qs!*" < u(qs!*")$ q&!*", %! # (0, 1) X7cY
oFrom *erentsen and Rocheteau X2000aY, 9e also kno9 that in the Iarter economy terms
of trade in asymmetric matches are socially ine!cient in the sense that the total surplus
of the match is not maMimi:ed. Fhis implies
!u(q&!*")$ qs!*" + u(qs!*")$ q&!*" < !u(q!!)$ q!! + u(q!)$ q! %! # (0, 1) X77Y
Accordingly, X7cY and X77Y imply that
!u(q&!*")$ qs!*" <
!u(q!!)$ q!! + u(q!)$ q!
2
%! # (0, 1)
From this 9e deduce that D0(!)$D-(!) > 0 for all ! # (0, 1).
.T. Hr""f "f 6e++a 7
Fhe proof is Iy contradiction. Assume that everyone produces high JualityP ! = 1. From
X5Y, 9e nd f(10 &) = 1 and f&(10 &) = 0. According to X2cY and the fact that f&(%!0 &) = 0
for all %!, the condition I(&, &) = 0 can Ie re9ritten as C !(&) = 0. ConseJuently, if ! = 1,
households choose to Ie uninformed X& = 0Y. *ut if & = 0, the uniJue eJuiliIrium is
nonactive, 9hich contradicts the initial assumption.
Note further that & cannot Ie eJual to one in eJuiliIrium. Indeed, if & = 1, households
9ould choose ! = 1, Iut then it 9ould Ie rational for households to Ie uninformed X& = 0Y.
.7U. Hr""f "f Hr"p"siti"n L
Hart 7. <=e barter ec"n"+%. In the Iarter eJuiliIrium, there is no trade if one the
player is recogni:ed as a lo9-Juality producer. ConseJuently, (%!, %") # {!, 1}%. From X2cY
and the fact that $ = 0, the condition I(&, &) = 0 can Ie re9ritten as
C !(&) =
1
&"i*"j'""!*"#2
%
%!u
"
q&"
#$ %"qs"& f&(%!0 &)f(%"0 &)
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oFrom X5Y, 9e oItain
C !(&) = &!% 'u(q!)$ q!( + (1$ &)! %u(q&"*!)$!qs"*!&
$&! %!u "q&!*"#$ qs!*"&$ (1$ &) '!u(q!!)$!q!!( X7QY
Fhe ZUS of X7QY is increasing in & and is eJual to 0 if & = 0. Fhe RUS of X7QY is a linear
function of &. If & = 0 it is eJual to
!
%
u(q&"*!)$!qs"*!
&$ '!u(q!!)$!q!!( X79Y
Under the iso-elasticity specication for the utility function, i.e., u(q) = ,#"q%, 9e have
q&"*! = !
1
(1"")(1+") , qs"*! = !
"
(1"")(1+") and q!! = !
1
1"" . Fhe eMpression X79Y can Ie re9ritten
as
!
%
u(q&"*!)$!qs"*!
&$! 'u(q!!)$ q!!( = !< 1, $!
=6
!
"
1""2 $! "1""
7
& 0
ConseJuently, X79Y is strictly positive for all ! # (0, 1' and is eJual to 0 for ! # {0, 1}.
oFrom the fact that the RUS of X7QY is a linear function of & that is strictly positive
at & = 0 for all ! # (0, 1', and from the assumption C !!!(&) & 0, 9e deduce that if
C !(1) > !% 'u(q!)$ q!( $ ! %!u "q&!*"#$ qs!*"&, there is a uniJue value of & on (0, 1' that
satises X7QY. If C !(1) ' !% 'u(q!)$ q!( $ ! %!u "q&!*"#$ qs!*"&, then & = 1. Fhe function
that relates & to ! is laIelled $-(!). From the previous discussion 9e have $-(!) > 0
for all ! # (0, 1'. Finally, 9e deduce from X7QY that $-(0) = $-(1) = 0.
Hart 9. <=e +"netar% ec"n"+% under t=e Fried+an ru>e. *erentsen and Ro-
cheteau X2000aY have sho9n that under the Friedman rule, in each meeting agents transfer
money so that the total surplus of each match is split evenly. Fhis implies thatP
%!u
"
q&"
#$ qs" $ x"$ = %!u
"
q!"i
#$ q!"i + %"u(q!"j)$ q!"j
2
XQ0Y
According to X2cY, the condition I(&, &) = 0 can Ie re9ritten as
C !(&) =
1
&"i*"j'""#*!*"#2
'"
%!u
"
q&"
#$ qs" $ x"$#+ (1$ %")q!"j( f&(%!0 &)f(%"0 &)
Using XQ0Y, 9e have
C !(&) =
1
&"i*"j'""#*!*"#2
(
%!u
"
q!"i
#$ q!"i + %"u(q!"j)$ q!"j
2
+ (1$ %")q!"j
)
f&(%!0 &)f(%"0 &)
After some calculation 9e oItain
C !(&) =
! 'u(q!)$ q!($ '!u(q!!)$ q!!(
2
XQ1Y
4c
*ecause of the concavity of the utility function, 9e have u(q!)$u(q!!) & u!(q!) (q! $ q!!) =
q! $ q!!, 9hich implies that ! 'u(q!)$ u(q!!)( & ! (q! $ q!!) > !q! $ q!! if ! # (0, 1). Fhe
RUS of XQ1Y is strictly positive. ConseJuently, 9e can introduce a function $/ (!) that
relates & and ! as follo9s. If C !(1) >
!(.&)#'#)#)#'!.&)#!'#)#!(
%
, then $/ (!) is the value of
& that satises XQ1Yl other9ise $/ (!) = 1. From XQ1Y, one can check that $/ (!) > 0
for all ! # (0, 1', $/ (0) = 0, and 12)!$"$/ (!) = 0 Xif ! = 1 there is no monetary
eJuiliIriumY.
Hart A. RanVing "f $- (!) and $/ (!)
In the Iarter economy, the optimal choice of information is given Iy eJuation X7QY, 9hich
can Ie re9ritten as follo9sP
6!&&'
!
= &! 'u(q!)$ q!( + (1$ &) %u(q&"*!)$!qs"*!&
$& %!u "q&!*"#$ qs!*"&$ (1$ &) 'u(q!!)$ q!!( XQ2Y
In the monetary economy, the optimal choice of information is given Iy eJuation XQ1Y 9hich
can Ie re9ritten as follo9sP
C !(&)
!
=
'u(q!)$ q!($
4
u(q!!)$ )
#
!
!
5
2
XQRY
For ! close to :ero, the RUS of XQRY is approMimately eJual to (.&)
#'#)#)
%
> 0, 9hereas the
RUS of XQ2Y approaches :ero. ConseJuently, $- (!) < $/ (!) if ! is close to 0.
.77. Hr""f "f Hr"p"siti"n O.
Hart 7. <=e barter eDui>ibriu+.
According to Xc9Y and X7QY, in a Iarter eJuiliIrium, & satises the follo9ing eJuationP
A& = &
(1$ ,)
,
/
!%- $ (!-)
2""2
1""2
0
+ (1$ &)
<
1
,
$!-
=/
(!-)
1+"""2
1""2 $ (!-)
1
1""
0
XQ4Y
9ith
!- =
!"#
4
&&"#%'
&"#&'%
5 (1"")(1+")
"
if & < &- = ,
1 other9ise
According to lemma 1, !- < 1 in eJuiliIrium. Kultiplying each side of XQ4Y Iy %&&"#%' , 9e
oItain
A
,
(1$ ,) =
/
!%- $ (!-)
2""2
1""2
0
+
1
(!-)
"
1""2
<
1
,
$!-
=/
(!-)
1+"""2
1""2 $ (!-)
1
1""
0
Simplifying the RUS of this last eMpression, 9e have
A
,
(1$ ,) =
1
,
!-
/
1$ (!-)
"2
1""2
0
XQ5Y
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Fhe eJuiliIrium fraction of high-Juality producers in the Iarter economy is a !- # (0, 1'
that satises XQ5Y. It can immediately Ie checked that the RUS of XQ5Y is strictly positive
for all !- # (0, 1' and is eJual to 0 for !- # {0, 1}.
Zet !*+,- the value of !- # (0, 1' such that the derivative of RUS of XQ5Y is :ero. !*+,-
is uniJue and is given Iy
!*+,- =
"
1$ ,%# 1""2"2
ConseJuently, there is a threshold A for the information cost such that the follo9ing is
trueP If A = A, !- = !*+,- . If A > A, there is no active Iarter eJuiliIrium. If A < A,
there are t9o active Iarter eJuiliIria. Fhe threshold A is the value of A that satises XQ5Y
9ith !- = !*+,- . Fherefore it is eJual to
A =
(1$ ,%) 1"2
1 + ,
XQcY
It can Ie sho9n that for all , # (0, 1', $3
$%
< 0.
Hart 9. <=e +"netar% eDui>ibriu+.
According to XQ1Y, if a monetary eJuiliIrium eMists, & must satisfy the follo9ing eJuationP
A& =
<
1$ ,
2,
=4
!/ $ (!/)
1
1""
5
XQ7Y
9ith
!/ (&) =
/
& (1$ ,)
2, (1$ &)
0"#%
if & <
2,
1 + ,
XQQY
oFrom XQQY, 9e can eMpress & asP
& =
2, (!/)
1
1""
1$ ,+ 2, (!/)
1
1""
XQ9Y
SuIstituting this eMpression into XQ7Y yields
A =
(1$ ,)
(2,)%
4
1$ ,+ 2, (!/)
1
1""
5 4
(!/)
""
1"" $ 1
5
X90Y
It can Ie veried that the RUS of X90Y is innite for !/ = 0 and is eJual to 0 for !/ = 1.
ConseJuently, for all A > 0, an active monetary eJuiliIrium eMists.
We di"erentiate the RUS of X90Y to sho9 that it is strictly decreasing in !/ P
3RHS(30)
3!/
=
1
4,
'
2(1$ ,)$ 2 (!/)
"
1"" $ (1$ ,) (!/)
"1
1""
(
Fhe factor in the Iraces is eJual to $" for !/ = 0 and to $(1 + ,) for !/ = 1. For
!/ # '0, 1(, that factor reaches a maMimum for !/ = )27
4"
"#%
%%
# 1""
1+" , 1
5
. If "#%
%%
< 1, this
maMimum is eJual to
2(1 + ,)
9
(1$ ,)
(1 + ,)
$
<
1$ ,
2,
= "
1+"
:
< 0
4Q
ConseJuently, $0#1&-#'
$!M
< 0 for all !/ # '0, 1(. Fherefore, the monetary eJuiliIrium under
the Friedman rule is uniJue.
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